THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Should Modernists have a Policy?

Modernism is a spirit : it is an endeavour, an ideal, a method, a group of working hypotheses, a faith : it is, as Paul Sabatier claimed for it in *Les Modernistes*, '*une orientation.*' It is not a set of clear-cut conclusions on a number of controversial issues in the spheres of philosophy, science, and history, where they impinge on Christian doctrine. The Modernist is far more concerned with the methods used in solving religious and moral problems than in the solutions obtained. Modernism is not primarily engaged in formulating a new dogmatic system, nor in creating a reformed ecclesiastical constitution, although Modernism is concerned in preparing the way for these things. Its primary task is the promotion of the spirit of truth, freedom, and love in the Church.

Whilst Modernism is mainly concerned with this, can it stop there? We think not, and for the following reason. The English Modernist is primarily not a philosopher, nor a scientist, nor a historian, but an interested, active, practising member of the English Church. As such he is brought face to face with a number of practical Church problems, and the policies proposed for solving them. This means that though as a Modernist he is mainly concerned with the promotion of the spirit of truth, freedom, and love, as a Churchman he must, if he is to be of the fullest use to the Church in his day and generation, decide what Church policies he ought to support because they promote the spirit of truth, freedom, and love, and then give all the aid he

can to them. To be of the right spirit, and to hold right prin ciples is essential, but it is hardly less essential to apply the rightly in practical affairs.

It is these considerations which have led us in this number o the *Modern Churchman* to deal with what we conceive should b the policy of English Modernists in a number of critical issue with which the Church at present is faced. We do not maintai that every Modernist ought necessarily to support the polic suggested. He may feel that in working to promote the spir of truth, freedom, and love in the Church, he is doing all that h need do. Nevertheless we hope that if he feels compelled t support and aid any Church policy at all, he will be won to sup port the policy we venture to outline in those important issue with which the Church is at present faced, and that for the ver cogent reason that the policy suggested in each case is an har mony with the Modernist spirit and principles.

The Doctrinal Issue and Alternative Creeds.

In the agenda of the Lambeth Conference of 1930, doctrin is very bravely and properly put first. Archbishop Davidso stated on more than one occasion during the Prayer Book de bates, that the Deposited Book made no alteration in the doc trine of the Church of England. It seemed to many less emine persons that it did do so, and that if it did not do so, it certainl ought to do so, seeing that there have been very great advance in knowledge and experience since the authorization of th Prayer Book of 1662—advances which have seriously altere men's views of Nature, History, the Bible, Divine methods human origins, Church institutions, and many other matters As the Christian to-day is rightly taught to affirm the continuou and progressive character of the revelation given by the Hol Spirit in the advances of knowledge, it seemed to Modernists n commendation of the Deposited Book to say that it made n change in doctrine. However, if we accept the ex-Primate' statement that it made no change in doctrine, at least it reflecte a good many.

However, the appointment of the Archbishops' Doctrina Commission in 1923 to consider points of doctrinal differenc

and agreement within the Church of England was a practical proof of the recognition of the fact that the subject of doctrine is to-day of great importance in Church circles. The Commission was appointed six years ago. It is still sitting, and we should say that it is likely to sit for many years, perhaps as long as the Council of Trent, but do we suppose that it is likely to secure agreement by Traditionalists and Modernists on doctrinal matters? Such agreement is unlikely to be reached for many years. What then in the interval is to be the practical solution? We cannot without loss go on as we are going. Not a few of our readers heard an eminent scientist say recently on a public platform in London that one reason why he could not be a member of the Christian Church was because of 'its materialistic creeds.' We all know how many men of real ability and piety have been repelled from the ministry by those creeds in recent years. The creeds constitute a pressing problem for the Church reformer. What are we to do with them? The Traditionalist makes answer: 'Keep them where they are, and use them as the Church has ever used them.' The Modernist cannot accept that solution. The creeds as at present used seem to him to be bleeding the Church to death. For him there appear to be five possible solutions of the problem.

(1) *Re-interpretation.* Abandon literal interpretation where no longer possible. Interpret the Creeds in the spirit, not the letter. He who recites the Creeds affirms the profound realities of the Christian Faith, and thereby unites himself in spirit to faithful Christians of every age. This is the policy of the older Modernist, but it is clear that neither the younger Modernist nor the Traditionalist will accept it. Both exclaim in unison: 'Are we to understand that the tune is everything and the words nothing? Surely words must be taken to mean what they say, especially in a creed of all places. Highly intelligent and sophisticated persons may interpret and use the Creeds in this way, but it is fatal to play thus fast and loose with very serious statements which may only be rightly used if recited in the sense in which those who composed them recited them.' Plainly the policy of a liberal re-interpretation will not meet the case of these people.

(2) Some would suggest *amending the Creeds* by judiciou omission, addition, and alteration. This is a most offensiv proposal to all persons possessed of historic knowledge an good taste. The Creeds are ancient historic document and may not be treated in this way. We might as well set modern sculptor to improve an ancient Norman font. Such a act would be rightly regarded as vandalism. Of course w might, perhaps, on the plea of going back to an earlier for in the Nicene Creed, substitute the *We believe* of the ancien form for the *I believe*: omit the *Filioque* clause ('*and th Son*') which by inference divides the Divine Unity; and als omit the Virgin Birth clause, both of which were not in th original Nicene Creed, but this does not touch the case of th Apostles' Creed, which is a much greater difficulty than th so-called Nicene Creed. The Apostles' Creed does not len itself easily to re-editing.

(3) Some counsel the *abolition of the use of creeds*. Thi course is out of the question. The recitation of Creeds a Service may not be, strictly speaking, a religious exercise, bu recitation in this way is not the only use of the Creeds. The are used for baptizing, for catechizing, for subscribing, a well as liturgically. A Church must have some verbal for of affirmation in which to express its faith. It may be as shor as the primitive creed: 'I believe that Jesus is the Christ, or it may be as long as The Shorter Catechism, but a Churc must have a verbal creed if it is to propagate its faith.

(4) Some would have us abolish the old, and *substitut new creeds*. Why not? Surely Christians to-day are as wel or better able than the primitive Christians to compose creeds 'I have many things to say unto you,' said Jesus, 'but y cannot bear them now; nevertheless, when He the Spirit o Truth is come, He shall guide you into all truth.' Unless the Church's professed belief in the presence, power, and possession of the Holy Spirit be fictitious, the Church has the power to compose new creeds to-day, and ought to do so. The old creeds are quite inadequate for modern use. They affirm some things which are doubtful truth. They omit all reference to the great affirmations of Christian Duty, and so give quite a wrong impression of the Christian life. All this

is very true, but there are two grave difficulties in the way. Traditionalists would never agree to the abolition of the ancient creeds, and if the Modernists became so influential that they could abolish them, ought they to do so? We think not. It seems to us to sin against Christian fellowship.

(5) The solution that we would urge as the only right and practical policy is *the authorization of new alternative creeds* which should be regarded in every respect as equivalent to the old creeds, so that either old or new, as the person most concerned shall decide, may be used. Of course we should have the oft-repeated jibe uttered once again. 'The Church of England does not know her own mind.' The Church of England knows her mind very well indeed. She is an essentially comprehensive and tolerant Church. She is striving, as a National Church should, to house three religions, or rather three Christian schools, under one roof, and though fanatics and fools may jibe, what they really fear is lest she should succeed. As we read her history it seems to us that she has mainly failed when she lacked the courage and love to be comprehensive. Again, it will be objected that we shall have disputes in every parish as to which creeds should be used. We do not think so. A few contentious persons might object at first, but Englishmen are essentially reasonable and have a genius for practical compromise. Of course if the parish priest be a fool or a fanatic or both, there will be trouble about the alternative creeds, but with that sort of person in charge there would be trouble in any case. What is important is that Churchmen with many different views and tastes should learn to live together and worship together in fellowship—a fellowship which does not make unity dependent upon uniformity. The days of uniformity are done with, never to return: the day of reasonable and orderly variation within comprehensive limits has arrived.

It will naturally be asked: What new creed can hope to gain general acceptance? The following creed, well-known to many Modernists, has won general acceptance among them. It is much older than our ancient creeds, for it consists of citations from the writings of St. John, and it should carry something of the weight of his authority with Traditionalists. It omits any refer-

ence to the controversial issues which divide Traditionalists an Modernists. We are sure that no reasonable Churchman wil assert that what in such a Creed is omitted is necessarily denied This Creed is not only an affirmation of Christian Faith, bu also of Christian Duty. An earnest Anglo-Catholic parish pries to whom we introduced it, said later that he was using it as th basis for preparing his candidates for Confirmation, as he foun it to be better for that purpose than the Apostles' Creed. Th proposed alternative creed runs as follows :—

> We believe that God is Spirit, and they that worship Him must wo ship Him in spirit and in truth.
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> We believe that God is Light, and that if we walk in the light, a He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another.
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> We believe that God is Love, and that everyone that loveth is bor of God and knoweth God.
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> We believe that Jesus is the Son of God, and that God hath give to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son.
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> We believe that we are children of God, and that He hath given u of His Spirit.
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> We believe that if we confess our sins He is faithful and just t forgive us our sins.
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> We believe that the world passeth away and the lust thereof, bu he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever. Amen.

Although the proposal of alternative creeds may seem novel to some of our readers, it should be borne in mind that our Prayer Book already contains three creeds, and this indicates that the English Church regards a single creed as inadequate for all occasions and uses. This fact may be reasonably claimed to have prepared the way for the extention of the practice in the direction we have advocated.

Modernists and Reunion.

Reunion as a practical Church problem is growing in importance. What has recently been accomplished in Scotland, what many hope will be accomplished in South India, have increased the desire for it in England. The conferences of Lambeth, Stockholm, Lausanne, and Jerusalem, may have helped to promote reunion elsewhere, but so far as this country is concerned we have made no advance during the last fifteen years. The reason is clear. We have no practical policy. Those who desire reunion will have to unite in a clear-headed policy. Fervour, aspiration, courage, vigour, are not enough. We need to possess a clear-cut policy, and then to secure support for it.

(1) The Modernist desires reunion; he is conscious of the weakness and the scandal caused by 'our unhappy divisions,' but what kind of reunion does he want? Plainly he wants a form of reunion which will promote and not check the spirit of truth, freedom, and love in the Church. Any form of reunion which denies or restricts the spirit of truth, freedom, and love, the Modernist cannot support, but is bound to oppose with all his power. The Modernist desires not a black but a white international. A reunion of Christendom which would check the development of the Christian Religion and so reduce its power of expansion would prove a curse and not a blessing to mankind.

There are many who are working for reunion, but it is reunion with an imperialist and unreformed Romanism. The Modernist must obviously oppose such efforts. Reunion with Rome as Rome is at present, would mean surrender to tyranny and superstition. Such reunion, if accomplished, would be a calamity of the first magnitude. The Modernist does not feel convinced that the Church of Rome will never exchange the spirit of Caesarism for the spirit of Christ—all things are possible. Nevertheless it was the spirit of Caesarism which was mainly, if not entirely, responsible for the shattering of Christian unity, and until that spirit is exorcised, negotiations for reunion with Rome are not only fatuous, but are even disloyal to the spirit of Christian truth and freedom, and also, as reflection will show, to the spirit of Christian love. This being so the Modernist can, at the present time, only support the policy of re-union with non-Roman Christendom. And in the non-Roman sphere his chief effort will be to secure reunion with the Reformed Churches, and especially with those existing within the British Empire. We do not value lightly the privileges of Christian fellowship with the Continental Reformed Churches and with the much-enduring Orthodox Churches of the East, but we are rightly told that 'charity begins at home.' To love our ecclesiastical neighbours, to re-unite with those who have been separated from us during the last 350 years and for whose separation we are in some measure to blame, that is our first duty. Home reunion would enable us to solve very quickly and comparatively easily the reunion problems in the foreign mission-field.

(2) How is the Modernist going to proceed in the field of home-reunion? This is a very important question. Dr. Sanday said on one occasion:

> 'I do not say that he took hold of the wrong end of the stick: I think he took hold of the right end of the stick, but what I am sure of is that he took hold of the right end in the wrong way.'

There has been a good deal of that in our efforts to secure re-union at home.

We hold that the first thing the Modernist must work for in the Church of England is *open communion*. By first we mean first in importance and first in time. He must strive to secure the declaration by our Church authorities that all communicants of other Christian bodies are free and welcome, should they desire it, to receive Holy Communion in the English Church. Such a declaration would provide the sincerest testimony to the *validity* of the sacraments as ministered in the Free Churches and to our acknowledgement of the grace of the Holy Spirit operative in their ministers and their ministerial acts. If we admit their communicants to our feast of Christian Fellowship, then we acknowledge thereby in the most practical way that those who have been admitted to Communion in the Free Churches are real communicants and that those who made them communicants are true ministers of Jesus Christ. If we do not do this, all our affirmations about the Grace of God and the power of the Holy Spirit manifest in their ministries are of very little worth. Interchange of pulpits, fraternal gatherings of ministers, united services on great public occasions, co-operation in philanthropic activities and in moral crusades, although not without their value, have failed to re-unite the separatist bodies. The policy of *open communion in the English Church for communicants of all other Christian bodies* would do more than any of these other efforts to eliminate schism.

(3) In conjunction with, but in subordination to this policy, *interdenominationalism* should be encouraged. Our English Sovereign is a member of two Churches. There are many of his subjects who would gladly be the same. There are not a few who do not wish to renounce the Church of their youth, their parents, their friends, their native-place, who yet desire to share in the privileges of membership in another Church. Such cases are not infrequent. We give an instance of one. The son of a

devout Methodist family, after graduating at Cambridge became a member of the Church of England. He was confirmed and finally ordained in it. When he went home to see his people, what was he to do? Should he go with them to Holy Communion in his old chapel, or break the Christmas harmony by going elsewhere? Being consulted we urged him to go with them. Interdenominationalism of this kind should not only be permitted, but encouraged. At present it is discouraged.

The Modernist must work to secure that the exclusive clause in the present declaration of Church membership be deleted. Why should a member of the Church of England be required to declare that he is *not* a member of any other denomination? The insertion of this negation into our form of declaration has not been prompted by the Spirit of Christ, but by the spirit of ecclesiastical exclusiveness. Christian love demands its excision.

(4) The third stage in the campaign for reunion will be concerned with *denominational federation*. We assume that this would mean that while each denomination retained its particular doctrine, rites, organizations, endowments, all the denominations would arrange to unite their forces in the various spheres of Christian activity, and to co-operate as allies and not behave as either rivals or competitors. Denominational federation would proceed by stages. It might begin, for instance, with the training of ordinands in common: or with agreement for co-operation in a scheme of national Christian education.

(5) The last stage in reunion is *organic unity*. This would be consummated by all the Christians in England being united in one body, governed by one system. That seems to us to be a long way off. If organic unity is to be secured, it is plain that it must be of a very flexible kind. There will have to be wide comprehensiveness and large variety in the organic unity. Not institutional fundamentals, but the Spirit of Christ will have to be the uniting bond. It is this loyalty which is the one thing needful if Christians are to become 'one flock' (*ποίμνη*), and it was that His sheep might become *one flock* that our Lord is said to have prayed in St. John x, 16, not that they might become *one fold* (*αὐλή*) as He is often misinterpreted as saying (see Westcott *ad loc*).

The Modernist policy, then, as it seems to us, should be t proceed to Christian reunion by the stages of (1) *open Com munion*, (2) *interdenominationalism*, (3) *denominational federa tion*, (4) *organic unity*. If the first stage be gained, we believ that the others will certainly be achieved in due course. *Ma c'est le premièr pas qui coûte.*

But it will be asked: Dare we proceed with Reunion, if it i going to lead to a fresh schism? If we admit Free Church com municants to the Holy Communion, the more extreme Anglo Catholics will secede. Our answer is clear. By admitting Fre Church communicants, nothing is done to affect the validity o the Holy Communion or to reduce its benefits for any faithfu Anglo-Catholic communicant. If extreme Anglo-Catholics ar resolved to secede for such a cause, then secede they must. I is the old story of the Judaizers being repeated, and we know the line St. Paul would take in such a case.

The Modernist and Disestablishment.

The third pressing issue which demands a clear-cut policy is the Establishment of the Church of England. To-day there are not a few, who for various reasons, desire Disestablishment. There are Secularists who, like the Bolshevists, regard religion as the opiate of the people. They are convinced that the State ought not to encourage, but rather suppress, the drug-habit among the people.

Then there are the Sectarians; men who are sectarian by temper, and not merely by circumstance: they are moved by a sense of justice, or more truly, by a sense of injustice. Why should one religious denomination enjoy all the privileges of establishment, and that not my church? Let the Church of England be disestablished that it may be put on an equality with us. This is as though the prodigal son, instead of returning home, should demand that his elder brother be sent forth to share his husks.

Then there are the Romanists and Romanizers: they desire to unite all Christendom under the Pope. The Established Church of England is a most formidable obstacle to the accomplishment of this plan. The Established Church and the Protestant Succession are indissolubly united. Whilst the English

Church is established, the English Sovereign cannot be a Roman Catholic. Therefore a most important step in the process of Romanizing England is the Disestablishment of the National Church.

It is clear that the Secularists, the Sectarians, and the Romanists all desire Disestablishment for different reasons, but this will not prevent their uniting to achieve it.

It is reported that the latest recruits to the army of Disestablishers is the Bench of Bishops led by the Bishop of Durham. This we can hardly credit. It is true that the *amour propre* of the Bishops who strove for the Deposited Book was wounded by its double rejection. It is equally true that a subtle temptation has beset some members of the Episcopate, which has led them to confuse hierarchical pretensions with inherent spiritual rights. Yet we cannot believe that any considerable number of the Bishops will deliberately demand Disestablishment, especially when it is clear that Disestablishment, demanded as the outcome of the rejection of the Deposited Book, would inevitably lead to Disendowment, and would be followed by Disruption. Indeed it is possible that we might as a consequence be given a Re-established Church without an episcopate. When a contest of this kind is begun, events succeed events and create many unforeseen repercussions.

The assertion that the present relation of the Church to the State is intolerable spiritually, which has been reiterated of late by Dr. Henson, is not to be taken too seriously. When that prelate achieved the defeat of the Shrewsbury Bishopric Bill in Parliament, a measure which had secured the support of the Church Assembly, we heard no complaints from him against the intolerable tyranny of the State which had dared to thwart the considered judgment of the Church in her solicitous provision for the cure of souls. On the contrary Dr. Henson rejoiced, and somewhat exultantly, that the good sense of Parliament had checked an injudicious, though well-intentioned, act of Church policy. Under the circumstances we can hardly think the episcopate will fight a Disestablishment campaign under Dr. Henson's pennon; but whatever they may decide in this matter, the Modernist can have no doubt as to the right policy for himself.

The Modernist does not regard Establishment as a Divin institution any more or any less than he regards Episcopacy a a Divine institution: he holds neither to be of the *esse* of th Church, but both to be of its *bene esse*. Both are methods c administration, and the test of the rightness of a method of ad ministration is its effectiveness.

> 'For forms of government let fools contest,
> Whate'er is best administered is best.'

Judged by this test, Establishment has much to be said for it It has provided us with a sober, comprehensive form of Christ ianity. It has checked the three banes of religion—fanaticism superstition, and obscurantism. The competitive interactio of the three great schools of Christian thought within the *vin culum* of the Establishment, has made both for theological pro gress and many-sided comprehensiveness.

There are three ways of organizing the Christian Church It may be organized *imperially* and governed autocratically by a Church-emperor and his officials. This is the method of the Church of Rome. Or the Church may be organized *denomina tionally*. Those who are agreed on matters of Christian doctrine and worship unite on that basis. This is the idea of the Pro testant Dissenters or Free Churchmen in this country. Thei ideal of the Church is an unlimited number of separated groups of like-minded Christians. The third way in which the Church may be organized is *nationally*. The Christians of a single State or Nation constitute a single autonomous Church. This self governing Church is in close relation to the State. This neces sitates an understanding or Concordat between them—a mar riage-contract. It entails obligations and limitations on both sides. At the Reformation the English Church accepted the Royal Supremacy instead of the Papal Supremacy. On the whole the arrangement has worked well. The English Church has been a very remarkable Christian communion: one of its noblest sons called it 'The most splendid Church in Christen dom.' It has helped to make the English nation the most Chris tian nation in the world, and that in a very sincere, simple, prac tical way. It has helped to Christianize not only the nation, but also the State. Disestablishment would now create a very seri ous break in the English national life, and also in the English

tradition of education. The *dictum* of Archbishop Temple of Canterbury, quoted in his recent pamphlet by the Bishop of Norwich, expresses briefly what Disestablishment, or the rejection of the national for the denominational organization of the English Church, would mean. He said :

> 'I think Disestablishment will be a step down for the whole nation.'

Dr. Pollock also cites a half-humorous but none the less sincere utterance of Bishop Burge :

> 'If the nation really knew the value to itself of all that our Established Church brings, it would say to the Church : "In no case will we allow you to be disestablished, not even if you propose it yourself."'

This being so, it is clearly the duty of the Modernist to support Establishment firmly. This does not mean that he is ready to maintain that our present form of Establishment is absolutely perfect and unalterable. The older form of Establishment which existed before the creation of the Church Assembly may have been superior to the present form. This remains to be proved. It suffices for the Modernist that the Church representative bodies accepted the present form of Establishment quite recently, and that by an overwhelming majority. At present we cannot afford to have any further tinkering with Establishment. Every wise statesman is opposed to the raising of the constitutional issue. Should, however, a great reunion scheme of English Reformed Churches be achieved contingent on the re-united Church of England securing such a form of re-establishment as has, for instance, been recently secured by the re-united Church of Scotland, the Modernist would in that case be ready to support the reconsideration of our present form of Establishment. This means that the reunion of the English Reformed Churches must precede and be united to the policy of re-establishment before the Modernist can give any support to proposals to reconsider our present form of Establishment.

THE CONSISTENCY OF DR. HENSON?

By the Rev. J. S. Bezzant, M.A., Fellow of Exeter College and Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

THE Bishop of Durham has published his Second Quadrennial Charge under a title[1] which is not adequately indicative of its contents. Part II, which deals with the problem of Discipline, and Part III, in which the Bishop speaks of The Parochial Ministry, merit the careful study of all who care for the welfare of the Church of England. His plea that some check must be applied to the prevalent lawless individualism will meet with all but universal agreement. It is neither religious, nor moral, nor rational that clergymen of the Church of England should be permitted to give effect to their private whims in the conduct of public worship, or to introduce rites and ceremonies which have their intellectual basis only in doctrine which this Church repudiates as erroneous. These sections of the book abound with sage advice and useful suggestions which, if capably carried out in a spirit of loyalty, would do much to remedy the ineffectiveness of not a little pastoral work. The reader will understand why it is that among those who are in personal contact with Dr. Henson, or who know him as their Bishop, he often evokes an affection which those who know only his more public utterances do not easily understand.

It is a pity that so much of permanent good should, in this book, be overshadowed by a very unbalanced advocacy of a very difficult, far-reaching and controversial issue. The erstwhile champion of the Establishment has become the protagonist of Disestablishment, and it must be said and demonstrated that the zeal of the convert is controlled neither by accuracy nor consistency. If the Bishop had made his personal *Apologia* in a less personal way he might have saved his readers an occasional embarrassment, though his frankness possesses an attractiveness. Of his sincerity there can be no doubt; indeed, one is led to wonder whether the extremely vigorous language in which Dr. Henson almost invariably expresses himself is not, after

[1] *Disestablishment.* By Herbert Hensley Henson, D.D., Lord Bishop of Durham. (Macmillan & Co., Ltd. Price 4/6 net.)

all, a kind of smoke-screen behind which a self-conscious and very sensitive mind shelters in self-defence. His self-examination is certainly frank :

> ' My terseness of speech, and a certain vehemence of manner, mislead men into supposing that I am more convinced or whole-hearted in any case I take up than I am.'

Perhaps; and we may hope that much in the present book is thus to be explained. Certainly comparatively few have the time or the inclination to divest Dr. Henson's sentences of the adjectival rhetoric which must be removed from them before their rational value can be weighed. Yet perhaps, after all, men understand Dr. Henson's speech more accurately than he supposes, for it may be doubted whether any other man of his generation has, with such brilliant gifts as a speaker and writer and as the champion of noble causes, achieved so little persuasive success.

Had Dr. Henson been content to urge that recent events have justifiably revolutionized his views about the Establishment, one might have accepted the fact with regret and astonishment, and have concluded that words, in his former usage, had been deprived of their customary values. But a large part and the main purpose of his Introduction of eighty-three pages is devoted to the attempt to rebut, with all the assistance which a lavish and almost licentious use of adjective can afford, any suggestion that his change of attitude to the Establishment involves inconsistency. While we have no desire to write anything of the nature of a personal attack, we must maintain that this claim to consistency carries with it implications wider than those personal to Dr. Henson. What of those who hitherto have greatly valued his advocacy and defence of the Establishment as being the brilliant exposition of principles common to him and to them? They cannot believe that, without inconsistency on his part, the principles which he has maintained for more than thirty years can possibly enable him suddenly to turn right-about, unless indeed, some new and startling event or events have occurred which, by their novelty and supreme importance, have transformed the entire outlook in which the Bishop's principles were formerly envisaged, and so have deprived them of further relevance; and, since we cannot without even greater

folly than rudeness, suggest that Dr. Henson is not mental awake, if the suggestion of inconsistency is wrong, the ne factors must be such as could not have been thought of as re sonably likely to arise.

Arguments vastly different from those assembled in *Di establishment* will be required before men will accept Dr. Hen son's own opinion that he has only changed as the changin circumstances of his life have compelled. He defends himse by recalling that his championship of the Establishment h never been unconditional. But whoever thought otherwise Who *does* defend Establishment unconditionally? 'Erastia ism,' he says, 'is justly held to be a deadly error,' and he quote with apparent approval, the Oxford Dictionary's definition o an Erastian as

> 'One who maintains the complete subordination of the ecclesiastic to the secular power.' [2]

But is there a single Churchman of note who maintains suc a position? The word 'Erastian' has long since become a ter of abuse to be applied to anyone who would wish the Church t go, in meeting the wishes of the State, a little further than h who uses the term wishes to go. Dr. Henson writes:

> 'It is indeed apparent that only on the Erastian view of the State religious omnipotence, could the action of the House of Commons b justified, and only on the Erastian assumption of the Church's comple subordination to the State could that action be acquiesced in.'[3]

I believe that statement to be false, but whatever may be thoug of it as a statement of fact, one thing is clear. If the Bishop i not to be held to be gravely inconsistent, the possibility of th enormity of which he regards the House of Commons as guilt could never have been contemplated by the principles of th Establishment as he has understood and defended them. Th fact is that it was precisely the right of Parliament to do as it ha done for which Dr. Henson has so ably and vigorously con tended. Certain very relevant facts have recently been em phasized by the Dean of the Arches:[4]

> 'The right of a Christian people, through the Prince, to have a sa as to what they are as a National Church to believe, and what are t be the rites and ceremonies of their Public Worship.'

[2] *Disestablishment*, p. 94. [3] *Disestablishment*, p. 97.
[4] *A Christian State*, by Sir Lewis Dibdin, D.C.L. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd. Price 6d. net.) pp. 11ff.

was the great constitutional principle asserted at the Reformation. And again:

> 'It seems true to say that, though there has been no consistency of practice, the most considered precedent—the Prayer Book of 1662—is in favour of a revised Prayer Book being made with the consent of both the Church and the Parliament. A similar course was followed in 1865, 1871, and 1872, with the new Subscriptions, new Table of Lessons, and the Shortened Services Act. It must not be overlooked that on all former occasions of such work (1549, 1552, 1559, 1603) the State acted in the preparation or revision of Prayer Books on the advice of State-selected spiritual persons, but without Convocation. It should also be remembered that in 1662 the work of revision was done by the Church, and only ratified by the State, Parliament (by a small majority in the House of Commons) declaring that it had a right to interfere in the work but that it refrained from exercising it.
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> That this was the crucial point in the separation of England from Rome was not doubted by either side.'

Of these facts, none is more acutely aware than Dr. Henson and, so far from repudiating this fundamental position, he has consistently maintained its excellence. As late as 1921 he wrote:

> 'I think that, in the future, as in the past, Anglicanism must justify itself on the principles of the Reformation,' [5]

with which, at the same time, he described Anglicanism as properly continuous:

> 'A true expression in the twentieth century of the spiritual principles which emerged in the sixteenth.' [6]

From a date considerably earlier than that at which Prayer Book revision began, Dr. Henson very well knew that Parliamentary consent would be necessary to establish it as legal, and he earnestly defended the Establishment in which such consent is an essential feature. Did he ever so much as hint that the work of revision should be exclusively the work of the Church? Did he so much as suggest that his whole defence of Establishment would collapse if a revision proposed by the Church should be rejected by Parliament? He never concealed his conviction of the need of extensive reform of the Established system, and he realized that 'denominational autonomy and national establishment are mutually exclusive,' *but he did not want denominational autonomy*. He was the most vigorous opponent of that measure of it which it was hoped that the Enabling Act would secure, and as an alternative pleaded for the appointment of a

[5] *Anglicanism*, p. xxxix.

[6] *Anglicanism*, p. 267.

Royal Commission and for State-inaugurated reform. In word which he actually quotes in the present volume, he said :

> 'If, indeed, the nation no longer cares to concern itself with th National Church—if Parliament cannot, or will not, spare the time f ecclesiastical reform, or if Churchmanship has become in Englis minds so sharply severed from citizenship as to make the very notion Parliamentary action in ecclesiastical affairs appear incongruous ar even intolerable, then there can be no valid reason for prolonging th existence of a confessed and mischievous anomaly.' [7]

This was in February 1919. Ten years later it is *in Dr. Hen son's mind*, but not *in English minds*, that 'Churchmanship ha become so sharply severed from citizenship as to make the ver notion of Parliamentary action in ecclesiastical affairs in tolerable.'

As a Bishop, Dr. Henson loyally and energetically attempte to work the provisions of the Enabling Act; but he did not re pent of his opposition to it. Rather, he has consistently deplore it, not least because it

> 'can only deepen and stereotype the division between Anglicans an Nonconformists by transforming the result of an unhappy history int the expression of a religious principle.' [8]

If he continued to regret the Act as an abandonment of his idea of the National Church, and was really consistent, should he no have rejoiced that the National ideal was still explicit in the fac that a Parliamentary sanction was necessary for all legislatio proposed by the Church under the Enabling Act, and that Parliamentary veto could still prevent the eclipse of th National ideal by denominational autonomy? And in fact, *fou years after* that Act was placed on the Statute Book, Dr. Henso published a sermon delivered in 1919 without a word to indicat that his beliefs had changed. He said :

> 'Thus, though (as I have admitted) it is the case that at thi moment the National Church is not co-extensive with the Christianit of the English people, and that, to that extent, its theory may be sai to conflict with "reality," yet it is also the case that no other theor comes nearer the facts of English Religion as it proceeds in th parishes, and that the tendencies within English Christianity which ar most distinctive of our time are more favourable to it than to any rival Therefore it is not mere day-dreaming to think of the time as not fa distant when the theory and the facts will approximate far more closel than is now the case. The frame-work of a National Church lies read to our hand in the Established system. Let us treasure it against th

[7] *Disestablishment*, p. 9. From a Sermon preached in 1919.
[8] *Anglicanism*, p. ix.

day when the alienations born of former wrongs shall have perished from English minds, and the visible fellowship between English Christians shall be restored, based no longer on the shifting sands of political expediency but on the indestructible foundation of a common discipleship. Of the Establishment of the Church of England I would venture to say in the words of the Prophet : " Destroy it not, for a blessing is in it." It enshrines the memory of a great past : it utters the prophecy of a greater future.' [9]

Or again :

' Catholic, national, sectarian—such have been the successive phases of ecclesiastical development in the past. From sectarian back to national, from national back to Catholic, will not these be the successive phases of ecclesiastical development in the future? . . . The National Church of the future will be larger, more tolerant, less concerned with legally enforced uniformity, more watchful of the generous variety of spiritual types.' [10]

Is it surprising that people wonder what can have happened to the Bishop of Durham of 1929? To-day he regards his change of policy as necessary because men are more and more out of relationship with the Church; but in 1921 he could write, what is equally true now, that only in a shadowy sense could many Englishmen be described as Christians.

' save, of course, for the not unimportant facts, that they are the heirs of an immemorial tradition of Christianity, and that they breathe a social atmosphere saturated with Christian ideas, and are in contact, albeit intermittent and almost unsuspected, with the National Church.' [11]

The Bishop who to-day writes with scorn of the claim of any but declared members of the Church of England, according to the standards of the Enabling Act, to have a voice in the revision of the Prayer Book of the National Church, wrote in 1921 that great numbers of Nonconformists

' have clung to the view, which has strong justification in the history of English religion, that they do not necessarily renounce their membership in the National Church by joining some other society of Christians.' [12]

At the same date the Bishop who to-day writes contemptuously of those who attempt to maintain the closeness of the relations of Church and State :

' The distinction between Church and State, inevitable in political discussions, really enshrines a dangerous fallacy, as Hooker perceived.' [13]

When the Church Assembly created by the Enabling Act which Dr. Henson so sincerely detested produces a revised Prayer

[9] *In Defence of the English Church*, p. 108 f. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 110 f.
[11] *Anglicanism*, p. 209. [12] p. 228. [13] p. 229.

Book—in support of which the Lay House was much less unan mous than the Clerical Houses—and the Parliament rejects th Book, does Dr. Henson really believe that his representatic of the situation as a conflict between 'the claim of God' and 'th claim of Caesar' is anything other than irreconcilably incor sistent with the principles he had maintained and which my r presentative quotations illustrate? As Sir Lewis Dibdin reminc him, no one has more strongly proclaimed the utterly unrepr sentative character of the Assembly than the Bishop of Durhan who now takes a more exalted view of its claims than the pr moters of the Enabling Act! It may indeed be that there is n other recognized Assembly in the Church which could unde take the task of Prayer Book revision, but that acknowledg ment 'does not clothe an unfit body with fitness.'[14]

Can anything be more pitifully vain than that Dr. Henso should attempt to clear himself of inconsistency by setting ou the legal and constitutional changes which have taken plac since the Elizabethan settlement? All of them were either i active operation or present in principle during the years whe Dr. Henson was an enthusiastic defender of the Establishment Of what avail is it to argue that a personal Royal Supremac was tolerable, but that State control by the Parliament of modern democracy in such a matter as the revision of the Praye Book is an unendurable violation of the Church's inheren spiritual authority? For this same Bishop could publish in 192 with no suggestion that the words represented only out-of-dat opinions:

> 'The less talk about "the Church's inherent right" the better unless you are a sectarian, prepared to identify your own sect with th whole visible Church of Christ, or a Roman Catholic, holding still th medieval belief that the Church of Christ is a "kingdom of thi world," equipped with a complete polity, and ruled from Rome by righ divine. But neither of these positions is tolerable in itself, nor per missible to an English Churchman.'[15]

And:

> 'A modern democracy vests the nation's authority in the majorit of the citizens: so long as the majority wills to maintain a national pro fession of Christianity by the establishment of the Christian Church

[14] *Disestablishment and the Prayer Book*, by Bertram Pollock, D.D. K.C.V.O., Lord Bishop of Norwich. (S.P.C.K. Price 6d. net.) See p. 30

[15] *In Defence of the English Church*, p. 158 f.

Hooker's assumption retains validity' [16] (*i.e.* the assumption of the practical identity of the Christian Nation with the National Church).

Dr. Henson's inconsistency is not that he is now advocating a practical policy which contradicts his *present* principles: it lies in the pretence that the policy of Disestablishment which he now advocates is consistent with the principles which he professed for more than thirty years, and from which he gave no hint of departure until shortly before the recent proposals for Prayer Book revision came before Parliament. From this suggestion of inconsistency he defends himself in *Disestablishment*, but how pathetically inadequate is the defence! From his manifold speeches and writings on Church and State he quotes but two passages as his justification, and prints in italics the important words:

> *'It is not, however, hard to see that if this salutary indifference'* (of the State to ecclesiastical affairs) *'were to yield to any outburst of popular feeling, and a reversion to an active ecclesiastical policy should be induced, the time-worn connexion between Church and State would quickly come to an end.'*
>
> *'A point may be reached in the State's demand upon the Church, at which a higher interest than that of her immediate work would demand an assertion of her latent denominational rights.'—Disestablishment*, p. 5.

But did the Bishop ever indicate that the State's assertion of the same right which it had consistently maintained in all Prayer Book changes since the Reformation would constitute an 'outburst of popular feeling' and 'a reversion to an active ecclesiastical policy'? He did not. It is hard to believe that until the later stages of Prayer Book revision, when the Bishops began their task, he did not realize to what an extent the Church had departed from the ideals which he had advocated! The whole corpus of his writings does not suggest that he was under an illusion concerning it, and the very fact of the isolation of which he confesses himself to have been conscious should at least have led him to wonder. His record of his impressions received during the Bishops' meetings, and the inferences he drew from them, are indeed extraordinary. He realized, he says,

> 'that the Church of England was no longer sufficiently representative of English Religion to be competent for its historic rôle of the National Church' (p. 41).

The data upon which so momentous a conclusion is based is

[16] *Anglicanism*, p. 208.

surely slight. There had been sufficient criticism of episcop policy to suggest a doubt whether the existing Bench of Bisho was adequately representative of 'English Religion,' partic larly of English Religion as Dr. Henson had understood th term. Bishops, like other men, pass, and their opinions an policy vaccillate. 'I saw,' says Dr. Henson,

> 'that the Church had already been disestablished in the minds of t Bishops . . . Some of the Bishops had been translated from coloni sees, and were enamoured of the denominational freedom which the had once enjoyed' (p. 46).

From the utterances of those Bishops who have spoken sinc the Books were rejected, we can only infer that Dr. Henso read their minds incorrectly! But supposing it were otherwise Here is the argument: Because a number of Bishops had fo gotten or chosen to ignore facts which they had voluntarily ac cepted and vowed to maintain, and had got themselves so out c touch with realities as to be thinking that the Church was alread disestablished and so to be living in a world of illusion on s fundamental a matter, therefore 'a higher interest' than th Church's immediate work 'demands an assertion of denomina tioanl rights' when episcopal dreams are shattered by the exer cise of a constitutional right which has been consistently as serted, and episcopally accepted, since the Reformation, an most freely conceded by the Church only ten years ago! Trul the argument is amazing!

Dr. Henson draws a clear distinction between the clash o Parliament and Church Assembly about the Prayer Book an that which arose about the Shrewsbury Bishopric Measure: i the one case Parliamentary veto is an outrage, in the other i was legitimate. But it is arguable that if a particular area of th Church is not allowed to organize itself under the guidance o a Bishop for the furtherance of its work and spiritual life whe the Assembly has approved the proposal, there would be a great an interference with 'spiritual freedom' as is involved i the withholding of legal sanction from certain forms of worshi of which the Church by no means unanimously approved. Dr Henson, of course, would not admit the comparison, but h does not plainly tell us why. His own vote in the State Parlia ment, to his no small satisfaction, determined the rejection o the Shrewsbury Bishopric Measure. He says, 'a referendum t

the populations concerned would have saved Winchester also'; but no referendum 'could properly apply to those deeper issues which are commonly described as spiritual.' If by 'deeper spiritual issues' we are to understand the alternative Communion Office and Reservation—two matters which concern all who attend public worship—we may ask, Why not? But we are not told. Yet such a referendum to those who attend Church, or only to those on the Electoral Rolls, would, I think, have negatived both proposals as decisively as a similar procedure would have prevented the division of the diocese of Winchester.

I was not in opposition to the revised Prayer Book; but I cannot regard the Parliamentary decision as an outrage of the Church's spiritual authority, because I think that decision reflected the judgment of many Church-people whose convictions could not secure adequate expression in Convocation or in the unrepresentative Church Assembly. The vote did not pass judgment on the Book as Scriptural or otherwise, but merely that it was not in the best interests of the people that it should be given legal authority. Nor, as everyone knows, did that judgment extend to the Book as a whole, but only to the two matters about which there was the widest divergence in the Church. There was no question of doctrinal change involved, but only of the mode of expressing a particular aspect of existing doctrine. On this last and important point Dr. Henson is not only quite inconsistent but also, it must be said, seriously exaggerates and even misrepresents the facts in the attempt to emphasize the outrage which, he would have us believe, the Church has suffered. He actually quotes, on p. 123 of *Disestablishment*, the Preface of the Revised Book in support of his own statement on that page that 'no change in the old doctrine' was implied. Yet elsewhere in the same book he can write:

> 'The issues at stake were patently and confessedly spiritual, affecting the *doctrine*,[17] worship and discipline of the Church of England' (p. 98).

and he represents 'the grossness of the paradox and the magnitude of the degradation' by quoting the words of the Nonconformist, Mr. Birrell:

> 'It would be frankly unbearable were an assembly so constituted' (the reference is to Parliament) 'to express any opinion *as to the truth or falsehood of any article of religion*' (p. 98).

[17] In these quotations I italicize the exaggeration and misrepresentation.

and further that the Church of England

> 'cannot possibly recognise in such an assembly as the House of Commons any competence *to determine its creed* and the manner of its worship' (p. 99).

Moreover, it is regrettable that this buttressing of weak argument by misrepresentation is becoming almost a habit with Dr. Henson. I will call attention to three other recent examples. Mr. Hardwick, in *The Modern Churchman* for June, refers to the attack upon Dr. Major which the Bishop of Durham made in *The Bishoprick* for May. As is well known, Dr. Major insists most strongly on the necessity of the historical element in Christianity and upon all that we know of Jesus as being the foundation of Christianity. But in *The Modern Churchman* for October, 1928, Dr. Major remarked that 'there is something to be said' for the opposite, anti-historical point of view. In Dr. Henson's reproduction of what Dr. Major wrote it becomes :

> 'Dr. Major insists that even the historical existence of Jesus is not essential to Christianity. The Incarnation, Atonement and Resurrection may all, he holds, be believed without believing in the historical Jesus.'

This misrepresentation is the more serious in that, as Dr. Major was formerly the Bishop's Examining Chaplain, many will have supposed his Lordship to write with an intimate knowledge of Dr. Major's mind. It is quite inexcusable, because in the article in *The Modern Churchman* to which Dr. Henson gives the reference, the anti-historical position is explicitly repudiated by Dr. Major in the clearest terms :

> 'We may dismiss the mythological Jesus theory with the remark that it seems as grotesque to the scholarly student of the New Testament as Anglo-Israelism does to the critical scholar of the Old Testament.'

And in the little book, *Modern Problems of the Church*, which the Bishop had before him when he wrote, Dr. Major again and again insists on the supreme importance of the historic Jesus. We will leave our readers to imagine what Dr. Henson's comments would have been had his own position been so utterly misrepresented.

Again, a week or two ago Dr. Major advocated that the Church should sanction alternative Creeds. No one demands that Dr. Henson should not express his disagreement as vigorously as he likes. But in a speech in the Church Assembly he referred to the incident as a proposal to have two Creeds, one

that of the early Church and the other 'drawn up by the pundits of Ripon Hall,' and envisaged the possibility that educational controversy in the future might assume the form 'Vote for Athanasius *versus* Major.' The fact is, the alternative Creed referred to was a series of extracts from the New Testament writer we call St. John, and the Bishop's parodies were as erroneous in content as they were lacking in courtesy, and were quite unjustified by *The Times* report of the meeting to which he referred as his source of information. Possibly Dr. Henson meant his reference as a 'humorous aside,' but none knows better than he that there are those who delight to broadcast such a reference as though it were sober fact.

A further gross misrepresentation is to be found in *The Nineteenth Century* for September. On p. 295, he quoted Bishop Lightfoot:

> 'The threefold ministry can be traced to Apostolic direction, and, short of an express statement, we can possess no better assurance of a Divine appointment, or at least a Divine sanction.'

His comment is that this conclusion

> 'appears to be endorsed by that brilliant and independent scholar Canon Streeter in his newly published examination of the evidence, *The Primitive Church.*'

The fact is that Canon Streeter's thesis and conclusion are as near to the precise opposite of Dr. Henson's comment as they could possibly be. They are (see p. 261) that there is

> 'one result from which there is no escape. In the Primitive Church there was no single system of Church Order laid down by the Apostles.'

It is deplorable that the Bishop of Durham should, both in the Prayer Book controversy and in other matters, give the influence of his great position to statements so inaccurate and misleading.

Disestablishment affords other instances of wild assertions and strange inconsistencies. Thus:

> 'The State has become effectively secularised, and now, under the fiction of neutrality, undermines the indispensable postulates of the Christian Religion' (p. 81).

This grave charge is made by one who, as things are, continues to be a Spiritual Peer of the State and to speak and vote in deliberations of the State Parliament. He adduces no evidence beyond the assertion that 'The Morality of Christ . . . in some important departments (*e.g.* marriage) has been openly repudiated.' No one doubts that the issue between Church and State

on this important matter may at any time become acute; bu equally the Bishop of Durham knows quite well that there considerable difficulty in laying down confidently exactly wh Jesus taught on this subject, or even whether His sayings ar legislative precepts or ideal principles. What is needed is car ful and sympathetic study of a disturbing phenomenon, n heady generalizations which, if taken in a strict sense, are mo than half false. But here again he contradicts himself :

> ' No just or candid critic of Parliament can maintain that its condu of business has become less determined by Christian principles since became secularised than it was before ' (p. 56).

When we recall that in 1897 Dr. Henson wrote :

> ' If the national mind is set on objects inconsistent with Christianit then the hour for Disestablishment has struck; but until that is th case . . . then the conduct of public worship ought to reflect th national mind,' (see *Cross-Bench Views of Church Questions,* p. 6).

we may ask, If in 1897, why not in 1929? Why the strang suggestion that because the Church has become a relativel small factor in the national life, the demand for complete autor omy is the more essential? If the secularizing of the State making it more and more incapable of any ecclesiastical suprem acy, is not the path of sanity indicated in the words of Sir Lew Dibdin :[18]

> ' but it can hardly be wise for Churchmen and their leaders to anticipat this state of things and really help to bring it about '?

Is not the Establishment a protest ' against the unfortunate ten dency to draw a sharp line between the sacred and the secular ' If, as Dr. Henson wrote, ' so long as the majority wills to mair tain a national profession of Christianity by the establishmer of the Christian Church, Hooker's assumption retains validity and so long as the State's business is ' determined by Christia principles,' ought not the Church in the spirit of Christ and i the name of commonsense to do all in her power to serve th nation and permeate it with Christian principles? Assertion that the present relationship is impossible for any self-respectin Church are irrelevant. The Church's main concern is not he self-respect, but her loyalty to the principles and to the spiri of Christ. If the State refuses to sanction two matters on whic the Church herself is acutely divided, on what principle of Chris must the State be resisted?

[18] *A Christian State,* p. 18.

In fact, Dr. Henson's representation of the existing situation as a definite conflict between 'the claim of Caesar' and 'the claim of God' is precisely what stands in need of justification before his other arguments have much relevance. The suggestion that the Church Assembly is so divinely guided as to justify an identification of its wishes with 'the claim of God,' or, for that matter, that it is any more inspired than other gatherings of more diversely-minded good men, is a claim for which, we must suppose, the frequency of its declaration excuses a complete absence of demonstration. Once a man comes seriously to believe that he belongs to a gathering which is moved by the Holy Spirit in a manner which is not open to other serious men, he comes inevitably to attach to the opinions reached by that assembly, and to his own opinions, a value out of all proportion to their rational content. Few illusions have been more disastrous. Against Dr. Henson's references to the secularizing of the State, we would set the words of the Archbishop of Armagh :[19]

> 'We are often told that, in the modern world, the majority of men and women are indifferent in the matter of religion. That fiction is now exploded. No question in recent times has so deeply stirred the hearts and minds of the people of Great Britain as did the Prayer Book question. How eagerly were the debates read and the decisions regarded by the whole nation! The Press in foreign countries was filled with expressions of astonishment that a religious issue should so engross the attention of modern people. Now that is a tremendous fact, infinitely more important than any of the special questions debated at the time. I confess to a real amazement that this aspect of the subject has not received more attention. It means that, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, the people of Great Britain are profoundly interested in religion.'

Dr. Henson does not scruple to ascribe the Commons' Vote to prejudice. In as far as that may be true, Parliament, as compared with the Church, has no monopoly of prejudice, and Dr. Henson should be reminded that no public man did more to inflame prejudice than himself. Phrases like 'the Protestant underworld' and jibes about armies of illiterates generalled by octogenarians, and the like, do not disarm prejudice, or inspire confidence that by the man who uses them the issues are receiving that impartial consideration which we must needs suppose to accompany the divine guidance.

[19] Quoted by the Bishop of Norwich in *Disestablishment and the Prayer Book*, p. 21.

It would, however, be superficial and unworthy to attribute Dr. Henson's inconsistency and change of attitude merely to pique or sulkiness because a Prayer Book which he supported was rejected by Parliament. The prevailing moral and religious anarchy alarms him, as it troubles other thoughtful persons. He sees the Church relatively helpless, partly because a lawless individualism has run riot; he would fain make this Church a bulwark in the midst of chaos, and he conceives that the autonomy which he hopes Disestablishment would give would enable the restoration of discipline and secure a greater measure of definiteness; while the frank renunciation of considerable material wealth for the sake of what was believed to be a spiritual principle would be morally and spiritually bracing to the Church. Such desires are laudable, but the method by which the Bishops is attempting to realize them would, we fear, be disastrous. In backward-looking authoritarianism and ecclesiastical autonomy there is neither balm nor help for the modern world. They are quite impossible of realization outside the Church of Rome, and those who will have them at any cost will continue to fall into Infallibility. The bracing which the Church of England needs is of another sort. It would follow upon regaining the vision of her mission as not more than a part, yet a true part, of Christ's Church, charged to bring Christianity into the lives of the people of this land, taking a full share in all useful activities of life, and, in serving the nation limited only by the higher loyalty to the principles of Christ, while co-operating wholeheartedly wherever those principles are at work. The difficulties of the Bishops' position are realized, but instead of devising further schemes to safeguard the Church's 'self-respect,' let them endeavour to remove the causes which not unreasonably, if unfortunately, have made it for the time being impossible to secure legal sanction for their proposals. The policy the Bishops have now adopted will not arouse the hostility of the nation, whose temper has, I think, been most wisely interpreted by the Dean of the Arches:

> 'The difficulty of the situation is generally realised, and if the Bishops deal with it by taking steps to stop extreme irregularities of all sorts, delaying proceedings wherever possible, and infusing into their dioceses the spirit of discipline and loyalty, they will meet with a wide and understanding sympathy' (*A Christian State*, p. 19).

THE TWOFOLD TASK OF MODERNISM*

By the Right Reverend E. W. Barnes, D.D., Sc.D., F.R.S.,
Lord Bishop of Birmingham.

Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.—II Cor., iii, 17.

TO-NIGHT we have the closing service of a series associated with the re-opening of this Cathedral. To the efforts of Bishop Hamilton Baynes and the generous gifts of time, money and enthusiasm which have come from Church-people and from other citizens of Birmingham, the whole Diocese is grateful. For by such labour and gifts this Cathedral, too long dingy in its dignity, has been worthily cleaned and re-decorated. It is more a fit setting for its glorious windows which embody the genius of Burne-Jones. It is, too, more suited to be the centre of our Diocesan life. I do not pretend that it is the ideal Cathedral of a great city like Birmingham. Such a building should be a towering structure of modern Gothic, impressive in its vastness, suggesting in stone the mystery and the grandeur and the joy of the religious life of man. But, failing some great legacy from a merchant prince, we must be content with this more humble building. And, after all, of more importance than the building is the message proclaimed within its walls, the faith nourished by its worship and Sacraments. So long as men find in this church religious peace and an incentive to high endeavour and the quickening power of the spirit of Christ, none shall speak against it. Dignity and comeliness are of God Who is the supreme Source of beauty: and we can rejoice in their presence and use if here they help men to find communion with God in prayer and to pass hence to the busy streets around with their faith strengthened and their spirit refreshed.

By a strange chance this day is the anniversary of the consecration of both Bishop Hamilton Baynes and myself. Of his associations with the day it would be impertinent for me to speak. But perhaps you will bear with me if I make some of my own memories and hopes, stirred by thoughts of the future of this church, the occasion of my discourse to-night.

In Westminster Abbey five years ago to-day I was consecrated Bishop of Birmingham. I hesitated long before accepting the office. A friend who could speak with intimate knowledge wrote that 'in the circumstances of this evil time, the position of

* A sermon preached on Sunday evening, September 29, 1929, in Birmingham Cathedral.

an English Bishop is the *least enviable* of all the positions ope to men.' I was never a pessimist, and I find this present tim exhilarating rather than evil. But my own instincts and inclina tions were, and still are, for the study rather than the pulpit, fo quiet meditation and not for administration. It is horrible t turn from the urbane wisdom of thinkers and dreamers and t find oneself entangled in public controversy. I felt when I came t Birmingham that I should be driven from that realm of intel lectual adventure which is open to any man who has leisure t think and access to books. Fortunately my fears have not bee wholly realized: I can make some spare time for study an thought. And the opportunity is justified by the need. Seldom have there been years more fateful for the future of the Churc of England and of religion in general than those through which we are now passing. During the last five years the Prayer Boo proposals have been shaped and rejected. Within the Churc there has been turmoil and disorder unprecedented in its post Reformation history. We are, in fact, passing through an epoc similar to that of the Reformation. A second Renaissance ha given us a wholly new understanding of the origin and structur of the Universe and of this globe. The history of life upon thi earth and man's relation to the process constitute knowledg which many still find strange and disturbing. A new cosmology has inevitably destroyed some old beliefs and has made other seem so archaic in their setting that they are quietly ignored.

Moreover, such intellectual unrest is at present associate with the moral and spiritual degeneration produced by the War Historians can find many parallels to the religious phenomena o our own day. Republican Rome after an exhausting conflic destroyed the Carthaginian menace and, in the reaction which followed victory, extravagant Eastern cults flooded the capital. Old Roman religion with its gravity and piety was destroyed. The mystery-religions began their long reign. There are scholars who say that Latin Catholicism is significant, not as a variant of Christianity, but as the last descendant of the mystery faiths.

Many who realized how serious was the emotional disturb ance produced by the Great War expected that religious ex travagance and religious reaction and religious exhaustion would show themselves at its close. We are to-day half-submerged in

the spiritual back-wash of the War. Fear has bred fanaticism. Intellectual perplexity has been joined to spiritual decay. So old credulities have revived. Beliefs rejected at the Reformation four centuries ago are promulgated afresh. They are even more incredible now than then : but they are commended as 'strangely neglected elements in our Catholic heritage.' Against all these rightly-rejected beliefs no less than against religious indifference, it is the duty of one in such a position as my own to protest. He has to plead for the simplicities and sanctities of true religion, to argue against falsehood, to show the supreme value of the Christ-Spirit working among men, and, above all, while preserving his own trust in God, to persuade others to share it.

One of the main difficulties of the religious teacher to-day is the existence of a wide-spread belief that the Universe is essentially a mechanism. The fight which Huxley and his friends made against ecclesiastical stupidity two generations ago gave them a decisive victory. In so far as these Victorian men of science championed Evolution they deserved to triumph. But they were wrong when they pictured Nature as a scheme of laws independent of Divine guidance, with mind a mere by-product of material change. Thirty years ago James Ward in his great Gifford Lectures on *Naturalism and Agnosticism* pointed out the inherent contradictions of this theory and its inadequacy as a philosophy. Unfortunately the weighty arguments of the philosopher take long to penetrate to the pulpit or to the popular magazine. At the present time the notion that Nature is ruled by blind mechanism is general alike in the street and in the pew. Religious people seek to escape the menace to faith of such a belief by asserting that God does occasionally intervene by supernatural acts to assert His sovereignty. Some go further and assert that God by priestly mediation consents thus to intervene. As against such notions modern religious teachers must reassert the supremacy of God over His Creation. There is, says the Modernist, no blind rule of Nature by unconscious mechanism. God is the source of all that is. The world is the realm of His continuous activity. We may not understand His working : the problem of evil may bewilder us. But none the less God is above all and through all and in you all. He is Supreme : in Him we live and move and have our being. This is the primary conviction of the Modernist. Some will say that it is the primary

conviction of all Christians. That, alas! is not as true as should be. The Catholic believes in a dualism of Natural an Supernatural. He accepts transubstantiation with its doctri of miraculous change of substance. For those of us who see t Reformation teaching in the light of modern knowledge, su mechanical sacramentalism remains unbelievable. Mechanis and magic are natural allies: opposed to them is the free gi of the Spirit, the direct outpouring of Divine grace into t human soul. There is no warrant in the teaching of Jesus f the belief that the Christian priest has special powers or th there is some supernatural realm, opposed to the natural, whe we have to look for God's manifestation of Himself. To fin God in life's experience wo do not need miracle. As against a limitations of God's sovereignty and equally against any su gestion of priestly authority the Modernist sets the teaching Christ.

Equally he will not allow false oppositions to impair a rig understanding of the Bible. Many a Protestant, who forgets th greatness of the tradition of which he is the heir, thinks th God's revelation of Himself to man virtually ceased when th last book in the Bible was written. Such an one does not wholl believe that God is now active among men. He fears to allo that all modern truth is the gift of the Holy Spirit and therefo not unworthy to be used to pour light upon the Gospel of Chris

The Modernist is free from any such narrow and crampin tradition. He has burst his bonds. For him there is no authorit but truth. And in the freely-won conviction that religious trut was gained by the great Hebrew prophets and manifested i Jesus Christ he sets out to purify and revivify religion. He ha a two-fold task. In the first place he must defend and consol date the religious gains of the Reformation. As every schola knows there are in Catholicism pagan elements. These ou Church rejected in that great struggle for the purification of reli gion which we associate with men like Colet and Erasmus Latimer and Cranmer. The rejection must be reaffirmed. For th simple reason that they are still untrue we will not accept th dogmas of Catholicism repudiated as untrue at the Reformation

But equally the Modernist seeks to absorb into his schem of faith the new knowledge of our era. We must set the Christia message and our own religious experience against a new back

ground. Now the process is one of automatic adjustment if only truth is fearlessly sought. It is fear which paralyses too many religious teachers to-day. We should, for instance, expect the Evangelical to protect his beliefs against teaching which condemns the Reformation; but his offensive is weakened because he is always anxious to protect his flank against what he regards as the assaults of modern culture. The Modernist has no need to fear such flank attacks. He seeks truth and is untroubled as he welcomes modern science and modern scholarship. He is secure in his belief that the Holy Spirit of God is the source of truth. He has, moreover, his own religious experience, his sense of Divine guidance, his certainty that communion with God comes through prayer and meditation, his love and reverence for the teaching and example of Christ. And when men accuse him of infidelity, or atheism, he marvels at their misunderstanding.

My friends, it is glorious to have a revelation, a certainty, a mission such as Modernist Christians have to-day. Those who misunderstand us say that we are slipping from the bank of Catholic authority or Protestant orthodoxy into the ditch of unbelief. We answer that we have reached the uplands where the air is pure, where the wind of the Spirit blows and we hear the sound thereof. And we remember that where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. It is the sense of religious freedom that is so exhilarating in Modernism. We are assured of God's guidance and power by all the deepest experience that comes to our souls. Are *you* never led? Do *you* not know when some decisive action which you propose is in accordance with God's will? If your answers are in the negative, then, I say, you have never waited upon God: you have never prayed aright. But if such a sense of God's presence and power has been yours, why should you fear where His truth may lead? Follow the light. Put behind you beliefs of the religious twilight which still persist in Latin Catholicism: they are not Christian and they have no future. Put behind you equally fundamentalism, that product of ignorance and fear. Erasmus had no belief in verbal inspiration, nor had Luther. It comes from the Middle Ages, not from the Reformation. To-day it alienates our thoughtful young people because they cannot go freely to the Bible to take what satisfies their spiritual needs and to ignore the rest.

In many ways the modern outlook is uncompromising and

decisive. It annoys those who love half-beliefs round which sentimental memories cling. It perturbs those who seek some static religious authority. Such know, often enough, that neither Catholicism nor Fundamentalism can give them satisfaction: it is their complaint that they cannot find in Modernism a fixed body of dogma. Any such complaint rests upon misunderstanding. For Modernist Christianity is not to be classed among religions of authority: it is a religion of the Spirit. It is an attitude of mind, a confident expectation, an aspiration that finds itself satisfied rather than a matter of system and formula. Modernism takes the right of private judgment which men won at the Reformation; it joins that right to the illumination of the Inner Light and to the new aspects of truth of the discovery of which we in the twentieth century are justly proud. From freedom and inward religion and revolutionary science we create the new religious outlook.

Modernism starts with a trust in God which can now be based upon the knowledge that modern science does not exhibit the Universe as a mere mechanism. The Christian is thus assured that continuously active within the world there is Creative Spirit. And once such trust in God is regained, all superstitious practices and beliefs fade away. He who has such trust will not put a mascot on his motor-car nor have the car blessed by a priest in some fanciful pseudo-religious service. God does not delegate His protective power to some trivial mascot. He does not limit it to those who ride in a priest-blessed car. God's care is unceasing. Let us confidently leave in His hands the issues of life and death.

We cannot understand God's rule. How can we hope to explore His mind? Can the finite fathom the infinite, the creature of three-score years and ten see the goal of a thousand million years? And yet the spirit within us grows stronger as slowly the race moves forward in its search for the Kingdom of God. Man's blindness is not so absolute as of old. Religion has grown more wholesome, more worthy of Christ, as the centuries have passed. Let us preserve the gains hardly won by our prophets and martyrs. Let us add to them treasures of science and learning. And above all let us rest assured that whether we as individuals live or die, win or lose our own particular battles, God will never fail either His own cause or those who give Him loyal service.

PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF JESUS

By the Rev. F. A. M. Spencer, D.D., Chaplain of Brasenose College, Author of *The Ethics of the Gospel, Civilization Remade by Christ, The Theory of Christ's Ethics.*

THIS sounds an enormous subject, suitable for a volume of several hundred pages. But I do not propose to survey all types of ethical theory, nor the whole field of ethical inquiry, but to concentrate on the conception of good or value as it is treated by certain philoosphers familiar to students of ethics, and to compare their manner of representing it with the representation of it that lies implicit in the teaching of Jesus.

I begin by mentioning the threefold classification of ethical systems made by Professor Mackenzie in his *Manual of Ethics*: those in which the standard is law, those in which it is happiness, and those in which it is perfection. The most eminent representative of the first is, of course, Kant. I pass over Kant very briefly, partly because his ethical theory is now largely obsolete, partly because it does not seem to me to be welded into a consistent whole. Much, no doubt, might be said upon the affinities and differences between the categorical imperative and the Hebrew Torah, particularly in the more elaborate form of the latter as we meet it in the enlightened Judaism with which Jesus expressed Himself in agreement. Let it suffice to remark that Jesus in fulfilling the law really transcended the legal relation between God and man. For God He portrayed less as a King who commands, than as a Father who loves and is loved.

Kant professed that his conception of the ideal was in agreement with that of the Gospel. For the *summum bonum* was to him the combination of virtue and happiness, the happiness being distributed in exact proportion to the virtue. Hence, he writes, 'the doctrine of Christianity, even if we do not yet consider it as a religious doctrine, gives, touching this point, a conception of the *summum bonum* (the Kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the strictest demand of practical reason.'[1] Therein 'nature and morality are brought into a harmony foreign to

[1] *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, trans. by T. K. Abbott, p. 224.

each of itself by a holy Author who makes the derived *summum bonum* possible. *Holiness* of life is prescribed to them as a rul even in this life, while the welfare proportioned to it, namely *bliss*, is represented as attainable only in eternity.'[2]

Let us note here the two constituents of the *summum bonum* according to Kant, namely, virtue and happiness, and the func tion which he ascribes to God, of combining them in anothe and more enduring life. It sounds rather crude: particularl the external relation of happiness to virtue, and God's externa function of combining them. Nevertheless it is significant tha Kant did analyse the supreme good into these two ultimate elements, and that he believed that it could be perfectly realized only in a social and cosmic order produced and maintained by the Divine will, such an order as Jesus meant when He used the phrase 'the Kingdom of God.'

We now pass to utilitarianism, that is, ethical hedonism o eudaemonism, the doctrine according to which all intrinsic value consists in pleasure or happiness. Dr. Boyd Scott writes of this in these words:

> 'As the supreme test and regulation of life and its activities, "happiness" would appear to have the whole horse-sense of mankind behind it. Hedonism and its cognate theories have, in the judgment o the austere, been riddled and disproved times without number; and yet the ruck of men keep harping on happiness as though the scorn of such philosophers were an idle breath.'[3]

It is 'happiness' rather than 'pleasure' that the majority of people say they desire. This I do not consider a mere evasion of the derogatory appellation of 'pleasure-seekers.' Certainly the typical exponents of utilitarianism have usually regarded happiness as a more or less continuous series of pleasures. But this view seems to have been exploded by psychological analysis. Professor Dewey, for example, writes:

> 'Pleasure is transitory and relative, enduring only while special activity endures and having reference only to that activity. Happiness is permanent and universal. It results only when the act is such a one as will satisfy all the interests of the self concerned or will lead to no conflict, either present or remote.'[4]

Happiness is not merely more prolonged than pleasure, but is really more satisfying, being more a state of the personality. I

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 225.
[3] *Christ, the Wisdom of Man*, p. 153.
[4] *Psychology*, p. 293.

venture to compare the relation of pleasures to happiness to that of ornaments to the general beauty of an artistic design. As a few ornaments of moderate dimensions enhance the beauty, but numerous and large ornaments disturb the harmony which is essential to it, so do a few moderate pleasures increase happiness, whereas an excess of them, especially of intense and prolonged pleasures, is apt to produce a sense of inner restlessness and dissatisfaction. Pleasures have their use in enhancing happiness, but do not by themselves constitute happiness. *Per contra*, misery, the opposite of happiness, is not to be identified with pain, though pains undoubtedly increase and even cause misery. It has been remarked that deep happiness is consistent with and may render endurable even severe pain, whereas pleasure may not really be enjoyed if the subject has some grief or anxiety.[5] We may conclude that it is happiness much more than pleasure that normal and healthy-minded people really desire, and misery much more than pain that they really abhor. We may consequently select for consideration eudaemonistic utilitarianism, the doctrine that conduct is good or bad, moral or immoral, according as it does or does not promote happiness, or rather, the maximum attainable surplus of happiness over misery.

Now, according to the most notable utilitarians, it is not my happiness, any more than anyone else's happiness that is the value or good at which I ought to aim. Happiness being desirable, whoever's happiness it may be, so long as it is somebody's, the greatest amount possible under the circumstances is to be sought, the happiness of the agent being as such no more desirable, and we may add, no less, than the happiness of any other being.

It is in virtue of this principle that utilitarians claim that their doctrine is identical with that of Jesus. So John Stuart Mill:

> 'As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the Golden Rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.'[6]

I think we may allow that utilitarianism has, so far as its altruism

[5] See *Moral Values*, by Professor Everett, p. 110.
[6] *Utilitarianism.*

is concerned, caught the spirit of Jesus, and more so than thi quotation from J. S. Mill makes evident. For Jesus bade me help, not merely those who *deserve* to be helped, but mor especially those who *need* help because of the miserable an perilous condition into which their own wrong-doing has brough them. Hence He says, 'Love your enemies.' As the physician' first duty is to the physically sick, so was His first duty to th morally sick. The altruism of Jesus is not determined by merit but is so impartial in its distribution of good that it is actuall more generous to vicious people than to virtuous.

But it does not follow from the fact that Jesus bade us b generous and impartial in our generosity, that the benefits whic He would have us confer consist wholly or mainly in happiness so that we could infer that in His mind happiness is the *summum bonum*. And yet at first sight it is happiness or relief from misery to which the charity enjoined by Jesus in various forms i directed. When He said, 'Give to him that asketh thee,' 'Be ye merciful,' 'Forgive,' when He told the story of the Good Samaritan and added, 'Go and do thou likewise,' when He fore told how those who fed the hungry, gave drink to the thirsty entertained strangers, clothed the naked, and visited the sick and the prisoners, would in the Judgment of the Nations be tol to inherit the Kingdom prepared for them, He was surely com mending a eudaemonistic altruism, one that lessened misery an increased happiness. So also in His own comforting words 'Come unto Me all ye that are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you rest,' and in His ministry of healing, He was con cerned to replace misery with happiness. He wanted people t be beautiful and light-hearted like flowers and birds, and to live as children surrounded by the care and affection of their Father's home.

But the eudaemonism of Jesus is, as might be expected, more concerned with the life that is to come, that being *ex hypothes* more lasting and with larger potentialities of happiness, and per haps of misery also—the life that is to come both for the in dividual after death and for mankind in the Kingdom of God. Thus the parable of Dives and Lazarus constitutes a warning t men to think of happiness and misery after death; so also the injunctions to pluck out the offending eye and cut off the offend-

ing hand or foot, and the parables of the Great Supper and the Royal Marriage Feast, direct men's attention to the delights of the heavenly world that would take the place of this one. All utilitarians should, if they wish to be logical, emphasize more the remoter than the immediate happiness and misery to which conduct tends; but to Jesus the contrast between this life and that which is to follow, both individual and social, is more marked, and the life to follow more apparent, than it is with most of this philosophical persuasion. Hence the obligation He laid on His disciples, not only to assist Him in His works of mercy, but still more to preach the Gospel and instruct men how to prepare for the Kingdom of God. The eudaemonistic issues of the future so far exceed those of the present, that it is no wonder that the concern for the happiness of others manifested and inculcated by Jesus should be directed so much to religious and moral reformation. The wonder is rather that He should have evinced such regard for people's present happiness and misery. Of what avail was feeding the hungry and healing the sick compared to that of calling to repentance and faith?

Let us look deeper. The main value of works of mercy—as Jesus not obscurely intimated—is to make men better children of God and so more fitted for His Kingdom. Therefore He says, 'Give and it shall be given you; good measure pressed down, shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom.' Likewise, 'Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in Heaven.' And it is clear that He regarded His own miracles of healing as manifestations to mankind of the love and power of God. It is not merely the happiness that is desirable, but also the kind gift of happiness that elicits kindness in return and leads to the worship of the God of kindness.

Nor need we object to this that Jesus wished people to be happy anyhow, to have enough of material things, and to enjoy the natural delights of family affection and friendship, as is indicated, for example, by His discouraging fasting among His disciples. All this is surely understandable, since normally happiness is a sign of health both of body and soul, and health is more favourable than disease to moral effectiveness and spiritual progress.

So far we have not found anything in the teaching of Jesus inconsistent with a strictly eudaemonistic position, but it is a eudaemonism of such a far-reaching and profound order as to transcend what is ordinarily known as utilitarianism. The happiness for which He bids men strive both for themselves and for all is the happiness of the Kingdom of God, of sonship to God, of eternal life, of the love that answers to the love of God and unites His children one to another. Compared with this the welfare at which the utilitarian philosopher usually bids men aim is commonplace and futile, because fundamentally materialistic. Yet when we pass into these high regions, it argues, I submit, a certain presumption to analyse, as we do things that we can more or less handle and observe. Is it only the heavenly bliss that is ultimately desirable and not rather the whole spiritual life of which it is an aspect, the life of sonship to God, of participation in the Divine Being, of loving and being loved? Let it suffice to say that this is the good to which Jesus would lead men.

We will next consider the contrasting ethical doctrine, sometimes known as 'ethical idealism,' particularly as expounded by F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green. This corresponds, not so much to the plain 'horse-sense' or common-sense of the majority of mankind, as to the aspirations of the idealistic minority and of others in their occasional moods of idealism and yearning. Such are apt to be conscious more or less painfully of imperfection and to conceive, even though very vaguely, of a better life and character to which they may some day attain. And the longing and striving for this is the more fierce and eager as they feel their present state of soul to be one, not merely of incompleteness, but of positive badness, a state of sin and futility and inner conflict.

The favourite term for the good with F. H. Bradley is 'self-realization,' which he thus expounds: 'What we aim at is self, and self as a whole; in other words, self as a whole is, in the end, the content of our wills.' He deduces altruism from self-realization in this way: 'Man is a social being; he is real only because he is social, and can realize himself only because it is as social that he realizes himself.'[7]

[7] *Ethical Studies*, 1927 edition, p. 71.

T. H. Green, whose *Prolegomena to Ethics* was published about seven years after Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, strangely or significantly, does not allude to this work, possibly, we may conjecture, because of the pronounced egoistic phrasing of his predecessor's doctrine. He uses the term 'self-realization,' but more sparingly, and connects it more definitely with religious belief, calling it the reproduction in human consciousness 'of an eternal consciousness.' 'Human action,' he writes, 'is only explicable by the action of an eternal consciousness, which uses the functions of the soul as its organs and reproduces itself through them.'[8] T. H. Green occasionally uses the name of God as a synonym for this eternal consciousness.

We remember that Kant held that there are two constituents of the *summum bonum*, happiness and virtue. As the utilitarians equate the *summum bonum* with happiness, so do the ethical idealists equate it, at any rate in essence, with virtue. 'In our view,' T. H. Green writes, 'the virtuous character is good, not as a means to a *summum bonum* other than itself, but as in principle identical with the *summum bonum*.'[9] But the complete good includes far more than this, being in Green's words, 'the full realization of the capacities of the human soul.'[10] Certainly this involves happiness, though T. H. Green prefers the term 'satisfaction' as expressive of the emotional experience of the ideal personality in its progressive self-realization. His psychology is in this respect preferable to Kant's; for he conceives of happiness or 'satisfaction' as the natural outcome of virtue, rather than as an external condition to be added to it by the fiat of Omnipotence.

As utilitarianism expresses 'Love thy neighbour as thyself,' so does ethical idealism express 'Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect.' T. H. Green indeed quotes this saying of Jesus when he alludes to the growth of the Christian Church with its new ethic, distinct from that of Greek civilization.[11] It corresponds more to religion as a personal endeavour away from sin and towards righteousness, the righteousness which is rooted in sonship to God. Such endeavour we find illustrated in the pages of the Gospel by the publican who smote his breast and

[8] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 82.
[9] *Ibid.*, § 294.
[10] *Ibid.*, § 371.
[11] *Ibid.*, § 285.

cried, 'God be merciful!' and by the young man of wealth and position who wistfully asked, 'What lack I yet?' The utilitarian aims at increasing impartially the welfare of mankind in its most obvious form, namely, happiness. The ethical idealist is consumed by a longing for a wonderful life in union with the Life of the Universe. The utilitarian thinks mainly of raising the general level of ordinary well-being. The ethical idealist concentrates on the transformation and development of his inner life and the inner life of those to whom he is most closely linked. It is not only logic, but temperament and moral condition, that determines which of the two doctrines the budding philosopher embraces.

We found that utilitarianism was commonly deficient, as compared with the ethical outlook of Jesus, in that it ignored His reference to the beyond, to the higher life both on this side and on the further side of death to which the gift of happiness conduces. On the other hand, ethical idealism is plainly deficient, as judged by the same high standard, because of its one-sided emphasis on the self, on the personal regeneration and sanctification and spiritual development of the agent, the welfare and progress of others being only dragged in by social ties. I agree with Dr. F. R. Tennant when he writes:

> 'Not realization, whether assertion or development, of the self is the essential rule of conduct, but rather the use of the self and all its powers and talents for the furtherance of the common, as well as of the individual agent's, welfare.'[12]

The doctrine of self-realization, apart from, or in relative neglect of, the at least equally important doctrine of service, tends to the moral disease exemplified in the Gospels as Pharisaism. The common failing of the typical pious Jew of that period was to be concerned with his own moral and religious condition rather than with the needs of his neighbours; for instance, the one who thanked God he was not 'as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this publican.' Another form of the same moral perversion is that of the old-fashioned pietists who cared chiefly for the salvation of their own souls. When one has just had a conviction of sin, to use the hackneyed phrase, it is right to be chiefly concerned with one's own plight and peril and to pray for forgiveness and grace; as when one is dangerously

[12] *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 'Self-realization.'

ill or has just been severely injured in an accident, it is right to make it one's first object to get medical aid. But when we are in normal health of body and soul, we should think less of our own condition than of the services which we can render to less fortunate people or of the work which we have to do in the world. Constant preoccupation, whether anxious or self-congratulatory, with oneself, is morbid and unsocial. Jesus told men to be perfect by loving both friend and foe, and to seek primarily, not eternal life for themselves, but the Kingdom of God for mankind.

We have tested these rival theories and found them to represent different sides of the truth as it is in Jesus. What then is their higher synthesis? What is the more inclusive ethical principle which combines the broad and placid objectivity of the obligation to secure universal happiness, with the concentrated and aspiring subjectivity of the conception of personalities as developing foci of Divine life? Dr. L. T. Hobhouse seems to present such a synthesis in his little book entitled *The Rational Good*. He writes:

> 'The rationality of the good involves its impartial and consistent application to the world of sentient experience. That is to say, it is the function of the rational impulse in practice to embrace the world in a single system of purposes, just as it is the function of the rational in cognition to embrace the world in a single system of thought.'[13] 'The whole mass of social institutions, of philosophical, ethical, and religious conceptions, as well as the heritage of the imaginative world, of literature and art, must of course rank among social developments and owe their rise and progress to the action of mind on mind a million times repeated . . . The supreme development—that which embraces all that is good in all subordinate developments—is that which, bringing this central directive force from infancy to maturity, welds all partial fulfilments into a coherent scheme and moves to the harmony of experience and feeling as a whole.'[14]

The harmonizing or unifying principle appears in two forms, 'which may be briefly designated the principle of personality and the principle of love,'[15] the first apparently corresponding to ethical idealism, the second to utilitarianism, since Dr. Hobhouse regards his theory as combining the valuable elements in the theories of both Green and Mill.

To Dr. Hobhouse the good is not, as the utilitarian tends to represent it, like a simple essence more or less evenly spread

[13] *The Rational Good*, p. 80. [14] *Ibid.*, p. 110. [15] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

over a number of individuals, nor as the ethical idealist tends to represent it, the complex and growing life of each, but rather a social life transcending individuals, in which each participates according to the measure of his capacity. We should not fail to admire this conception of a great whole of living good, rich in happiness and rationally ordered—a vast system articulated into numerous interests and experiences, broad and deep and ramifying, personal and yet super-personal, peaceful and yet instinct with intense springing energy.

Dr. Hobhouse, while he admits that 'a personal God is the incarnation of the unity which the moral judgment requires,'[16] is yet doubtful whether this postulate is logically cogent. He does, however, go as far as to say that 'the reality which the moral order implies is a spiritual principle, which from its most salient feature we may call, briefly, the principle of love.'[17] He concludes by pointing out the remarkable agreement between the evolution of the world and the ethical idea, seeing that both consist largely in co-operation:

> 'The flower of the evolutionary process is the ethical spirit.'[18]

How does Jesus help us here? Surely, by offering us God. It is God, He declares, who constitutes the basis and unity of the 'rational good,' and also its nexus with the 'evolutionary process,' the non-human cosmos. God, the supreme, original, and all-pervasive Spirit, is that which is needed to sustain and develop and provide for this great articulated and harmonious good. It was then with a true intuition that Kant identified the *summum bonum* (the perfect union of virtue and happiness) with the Kingdom of God, the fundamental subject of the teaching of Jesus. For this identification delivers us from those misconceptions and misleading elements in the partial representations of good given us by the philosophers. The quest for mere happiness tends to materialism and futility; the quest for mere virtue tends to egoism and hypocrisy. But the quest for the Kingdom of God leads unto life, the life of selfless love, with the rich bloom of peaceful happiness, yet ever growing and striving. The good, as Jesus portrays it, is broad-based upon the will, the very being, of God, though achieved not without the virtue and effort of men; its attainment and permanence and development

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 149. [17] *Ibid.*, p. 156. [18] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

is absolutely sure; and participation in it will be more than satisfying. The greatness of His conception of the good, as compared with the conceptions entertained by the various schools of philosophers, is due to the fact that, while it includes and endorses all that they have to teach, there is so much of God in it. It partakes of the Divine eternity and infinitude.

The Kingdom of God is the increasing good in which souls increasingly participate. One form of this increase, according to Jesus, is the transition from mortality to immortality, to the state in which, to use His own words, men 'cannot die any more.' Eternal life is thus one aspect of the individual's attainment of the *summum bonum*. There are problems here as to the relation of universal to individual progress, which this is not the place to discuss. But the main outlines of the promise of good by Jesus are fairly clear: it is reconstituted and enhanced and expanding life, life that transcends death, life of many souls in intimate harmony and love, life for ever nourished by the life of God, a living Universe supported and ordered and glorified by the Divine might and love.

MORAL CHAOS*

By the Rev. Professor W. R. Matthews, D.D., Dean of King's College, London.

'What is man that thou art mindful of him and the son of man that thou visitest him?'—Psalm viii, 4.

THE consciousness that we are living in the middle of a moral and spiritual crisis is, I suppose, growing in the minds of most thoughtful people. Indeed, it is easy to think of the coming generation as standing poised ready to jump in one direction or another, and one feels as if one were holding one's breath waiting to see in which direction the mind of this nation, and indeed of the civilized world, would move. There are those of course who deprecate the language of crisis, and regard the situation with equanimity as scarcely different from that which has obtained often in the past. I do not so read the signs of the times; and we have learned from the experience of the outbreak

* A Sermon preached before the University of Oxford on November 17, 1929.

of the great war that the unruffled surface may be no indication of the real forces at work. So it is with the turning points of mind and spirit. They are prepared by the secret thoughts of many minds, and to the ordinary observer they come unexpectedly, like thunder from a clear sky.

If it be agreed that there is in fact some kind of critical decision being made in the sphere of the mind and spirit, there can be little doubt concerning its nature. It is first and most distinctly a moral crisis. We who grew up at the end of the Victorian age are still obsessed by the controversies which made that period so intellectually stimulating. We suppose that now as then, men are concerned mainly with such questions as Can we believe in God? the nature of Revelation and the interpretation of evolution. These questions are not dead, but they are not the uppermost in debate. The really interesting problems, at least to those of the younger generation, are those concerning conduct: the revolt is not against Christian Theology so much as against Christian ethics, and men are asking not Who will show us any God? but Who will show us any good?

This fact constitutes the profound difference between our present situation and that which has existed in previous periods which, on a superficial view, might be taken as similar. The agnostics of the Victorian age, the Huxley of those days for example, did not question the main structure of ethical judgments which had grown up under the influence of Christianity. They may have thought, as Herbert Spencer did, that the Christian ideal was too lofty for the use of man, but they scarcely questioned that it was, on the whole, some modification or adaptation of the Christian ethic which must remain the guide for man. There were indeed in that age men whose opposition to the Christian tradition went deeper than theology, but they were little regarded. The greatest of them, Frederick Nietzsche, lived unnoticed and died in an asylum.

It is perhaps worth while to try to gain some clear idea of what the conflict of standards really is about and to distinguish, if we can, the fundamental issues. Does it not seem that our discussions are strangely fruitless? We dispute vehemently about ideals and rules of conduct, but often our arguments are a confused noise. We beat the air, never getting to grips with the

opponent. Not only we who are Christians suffer from this disability. It infects our critics. We read Mr. Bertrand Russell on marriage, and he produces little effect upon our minds because it is evident that the author has never begun to understand the Christian standpoint. He sets out from premises which we do not accept. And I suggest that here is the root of our confusion. The disputants proceed from different presuppositions. Their conclusions are coloured by their axioms, and if they reach different goals it is because they set out from different starting points. There is in fact a prior question to every problem of human conduct and ideals of life. It is the question of the Psalmist: What is man? According as we answer this question we shall decide what is man's good.

I believe that an attentive observation of the present state of England and America, and probably too of other civilized countries, will show clearly enough that there are three fairly well defined moral doctrines held by the more articulate members of the community, each of them based upon a particular view of human nature. (Of the thoughts of the inarticulate mass who would dare to prophesy?) Perhaps we might call these three doctrines Naturalism, Humanism, Superhumanism.

The ethics of Naturalism have been battered by argument and riddled with criticism, notably in this place. The present situation is a melancholy proof of the feebleness of dialectic to influence the real beliefs of men, for never was this oft-refuted doctrine more powerful and more prevalent. It rests upon a definite answer to the question, What is man? Man is a part of nature, which is itself a purposeless and mindless mechanism. Man is just the most cunning of the animals. If you would know what he really is you must strip off the veils of illusion which he has woven to cover his own nakedness, pierce below the rationalisations which he has fabricated, and find the essential man in the instinctive impulses, the cravings and desires which he shares with the lower animals.

I do not know whether Mr. Aldous Huxley could be called an adherent of Naturalism. Probably he is too acute to be the victim of its fallacies and too sceptical to assent to any theory. But in one respect he has shown the logical outcome of the point of view. In his recent book, *Do What You Will*, he has rejected

the idea that we should seek for any unification of the self c any coherence in life and action. 'Follow the impulse which lie nearest' appears to be a modern and certainly a not excessivel exacting substitute for the older 'duty which lies nearest.' Bu the conclusion is not one which we can impeach on the premise which are adopted. If man is a bundle of instinctive desires then let him act as such and cease to pretend to a dignity whicl is, to the clear-seeing eye, ridiculous.

Dimly and confusedly this conception of man is at the roo of the most energetic attempts to revise the standards of life If man is indeed the cleverest of the animals and nothing more than the demand for a revision of the accepted code is irresistible That code has been built up on other views of man's nature. I comes to us from generations which believed something quite different about themselves. If they were wrong then let us revise the rules of the game to correspond with the change in the players.

Humanism suffers in comparison with its rivals by a distressing vagueness, and it would be difficult to collect from the writings of its distinguished exponents any body of doctrine to which all would subscribe. Yet we may be confident that it is destined to be a more formidable rival to Christianity than the naturalist ethics, for it includes many of the values which have entered into man's struggle for spiritual freedom. Humanism is far from regarding man as merely a clever animal. On the contrary, man and his thoughts and culture are the highest that the universe contains. The significant fact about every individual is that he is a member of the human race which is the bearer and creator of the culture, civilization, knowledge and beauty which raise life above the level of the brute. This great adventure of culture is not finished, the future is full of unknown promise. All may, to some extent, share in the spiritual heritage which has been won, and may in their turn contribute to its riches. To lay one's spirit open to the influence of the human values, and, still more, to be worthy to add to them, is no easy task. It cannot be accomplished by 'doing what you will.' It demands a strenuous effort to unify the self, to raise it above the vulgar mediocrity of the mass, and the domination of the instincts. The doubtful religious beliefs which have haunted

the minds of men in the past may be left on one side. The sufficient motive and inspiration is the service of the spirit of humanity.

The moral doctrine which we as Christians represent differs profoundly from either of those which we have briefly glanced at. There is no purpose in attempting to disguise the difference, but rather every reason to state it clearly that the issue may be defined. We shall not commend the Gospel by pretending that it is almost identical with humanism. The difference lies in the conception of the nature of man. What is man? To this question historical Christianity has answered, and Christianity must always answer, that man is indeed a child of nature, but far more; that he is a part of a spiritual development in time, but far more even than this. He is made in the image of God. His roots are in the unseen and the eternal, and his destiny is not circumscribed even by the probable duration of life upon this planet. His end, the fulfilment of his being, is not any achievement of culture or civilization, but the enjoyment and vision of the Eternal End.

If this is our conception of man our whole series of values will be profoundly affected. We have introduced a new dimension, and it modifies the meaning of every equation. For us man is not simply forward looking, moving through time, but upward looking, having his home in the eternal. We make a mistake when we argue on moral questions on the premises of our opponents. We do not believe that the final word lies with the calculation of convenience or with the interests of culture and civilization. We believe that the ultimate decision lies with the question, What conduct and what character prepares man for his unseen destiny?

The debate between these three methods of morals and these three conceptions of man will proceed and wax hotter in the coming years. I have no intention of embarking upon the debate itself. It will be decided not by smart arguments, but by the slow wisdom of the common man who feels himself to be more than the naturalist or humanist allows. Two remarks, however, in conclusion may be permitted.

(1) We can at least claim for our Christian view that it finds a place for the others and for an element in human experience

which they can never justify. We do not deny that man is of th earth earthy. He is animal in one aspect, and the needs of th instinctive life must not be ignored. We do not question th truth of Humanism. There is this forward movement of th human spirit. We can rejoice no less than the Humanists ov the achievements of the human spirit, and share that thrill of th adventure into the future. For us no less than for them a larg part of duty is responsiveness to the greatness of the humanist culture and the service of progress. But we have the key to or strange characteristic of this same humanity which they ca never find. We know why man has never found satisfaction i the progress that he made, and why no imagined Utopia has eve seemed to him worthy of his hopes, why he has been haunted b the thought of good things 'which eye hath not seen nor ea heard, neither have they entered into the heart of man.' It i because he has here no abiding city, but seeks one unseen an eternal.

(2) Christians are in the position of defending the tradition In a sense they represent a tradition which is older than Christ ianity itself, for the conviction that man is concerned with th unseen world and that standards of conduct depend upon super natural sanctions is the common and almost universal belief o mankind. The danger of defending a tradition is that we ma be led to defend that which is only accidental and temporal. Th conventions and special rules of life which have grown up from time to time are not necessarily a part of the Christian ethic. W are supposed to be averse from any departure from old ways It would be a disaster if we identified Christian morals with the social habits of the Victorian or any other age—even the firs century, or supposed that St. Paul's views on the proper length of hair and wearing hats in church had any vital connexion with the Christian ideal. The Christian Gospel as a guide for life is no set of rules or rigid conventions. It is a principle based on an answer to the question, What is man? capable of indefinite adaptation to changing conditions. He is a being of three dimensions. He is animal, arising out of the natural order and adapted to it. He is mind, coming forth from the stream of culture and civilization and finding his work and function there. He is spirit, coming from God and made for communion with Him.

BOOK REVIEWS

NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR OLD.*

Unbelief is already becoming a problem to the unbeliever. While the dissolution of beliefs was still going on, those who participated in the process were too busy to be troubled by doubts. Moreover, iconoclasts are generally the victims of apocalyptic dreams: they picture an immediate millennium when the fetters of mankind have been broken. Contrary to expectation, however, when their inhibitions are removed, people begin to enjoy themselves. When Moses was out of the way, 'the people sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to play.' Soul is human nature, and the emancipators are invariably disappointed. As T. H. Huxley observed (he dissented from the prevailing optimism of his time), 'A man's worst difficulties begin when he is able to do as he likes.'

The present situation, then, is depressing, and we are sunk badly in the trench. The elation of destroying has passed, apocalyptic illusions have faded, and we are left, not only without faith, but without hope.

Mr. Lippmann, with a lively and vigorous pen, describes the situation in which we find ourselves, and which he regards as unprecedented. Any fixed and authoritative system of belief has become incredible, not only to the few, but to the many. 'The irreligion of the modern world is radical to a degree for which there is, I think, no counterpart.'

Yet the modern world, unless it is to go to pieces entirely (as it seems not unlikely to do), must have some basis for morals. Assuming that the old basis has gone for good, where is a new one to be found?

Mr. Lippmann, as he is bound to do if he takes the view that the old religion is irredeemably done for, turns to Humanism. If man is the measure of all things, man need not look outside himself for moral standards or for strength to live up to them.

But the trouble is that if man looks into himself, he is not at all certain what he will find there. Rousseau found one thing; St. Augustine something quite different. The great question is, can we *trust* human nature?

The Victorian optimists, of course, were quite certain that they could. They were disciples of Rousseau, *via* Mr. Herbert Spencer. But Mr. Lippmann, living as he does in the twentieth century, knows better.

Nevertheless, Mr. Lippmann, since there is nothing else to trust, decides to trust human nature, though in a fashion of his own. You cannot say downright that human nature is good or bad; all you can say is that if there are no 'fixations' or functional disorders of character, human nature, in its *maturity*, is a good thing. And the new morality must be a means of ensuring that men do develop maturity of character.

Mr. Lippmann sees that 'the religion of the spirit,' or 'high religion' as he terms it, does develop, or is a concomitant of, this maturity of character—a maturity of disciplined desires and a realization that the world was not made for our personal convenience.

What it amounts to is that a religion, or philosophy of life, of which only a minority are capable (as Mr. Lippmann admits), will redeem those who can attain unto it. As for the vast majority, 'the religion of the spirit would suit their needs, but it would seem to be beyond their powers.'

It cannot be said, then, that Mr. Lippmann has succeeded in solving our chief difficulty, which is to provide moral sanctions for the masses. He supplies a way of life for men like Epictetus or Spinoza, who are capable of

* *A Preface to Morals.* By Walter Lippmann. (Allen & Unwin, 1929. 10/-.)

a voluntary asceticism, but they are just the men who can find their own sanctions without his assistance.

Yet Mr. Lippmann's book is of great value for two reasons. The first is his admirable diagnosis of the present position: as a mere descriptive analysis the book is first-rate. But more important still is his realization of the fact that the morality, and the moral sanctions of the future must rest upon *a scientific understanding of human nature.* This is where our Victorian optimists went astray. The new psychology has helped us here, and we are getting back to something approximating to the views of St. Augustine, who would have been neither shocked nor surprised at *All Quiet on the Western Front,* Judge Lindsay's *Revolt of Modern Youth,* or a Grand Guignol play.

It is conceivable, of course, that a knowledge of human nature may restore to us the faith that a knowledge of physics and biology has tended to remove. If we cease to believe in Man, we may begin to believe in God. It may well be that the two beliefs are mutually incompatible. J.C.H.

THE NEW SCEPTICISM.*

The battle between the vitalists and mechanists in biology goes on apace. The former declare that the organism is inhabited and directed by some non-material vital force (so Driesch, J. S. Haldane, J. A. Thomson, and others); whereas the mechanists declare that biological science is impossible unless the organism is treated frankly as a machine. There seems to be no doubt that the tide of battle has definitely turned against the vitalists: the younger biologists are mechanistic. In the longest of these essays, 'The Hunting of the Phoenix' (*i.e.* vitalism), Mr. Needham pursues the heretics and drives them off the field.

The actual debate is probably rather beyond the general reader, and in any case the decision will lie with the experts. It is more profitable to grant Mr. Needham his mechanistic theory, and then to inquire in what sense he holds it, and how he uses it. This is what he is anxious to explain. He frankly regards the mechanistic view of biology as merely *a way of looking at things,* indispensable for accurate scientific research (which must always be rigidly quantitative in method), but devoid of metaphysical validity.

'We may regard the mechanistic view of the world as a legitimate methodological distortion, capable of application to any phenomena whatever, and possessing no value at all as a metaphysical doctrine. Such a standpoint let us call Neo-mechanism' (p. 28).

Such is the position to which criticism of the scientific method has brought us. 'Mechanism' is less in the objects themselves than in the spectacles with which we survey them. Thus 'the scientific picture of the universe is a restricted one because of the distortions inherent in it.'

So far so good. Religions and philosophical thinkers will be well pleased to discover a man of science infected with such wholesome scepticism as to the complete adequacy of scientific knowledge. Still greater, in all probability, will be their satisfaction, when they find (p. 60) Mr. Needham emphasizing 'the remarkable revival of interest in mysticism which has occurred in the last twenty-five years.'

But they will discover that the 'subjectivism' of the Neo-mechanists is a double-edged weapon. If science is subjective, religion is in the same boat. The result of the new criticism has been 'a universal subjectivation of the two great fields of human experience, which were once so objective and so mutually incompatible.' Science and religion have been brought together by being reduced to the same plane. 'They are two states of mind,

* *The Sceptical Biologist.* By Joseph Needham. (Chatto & Windus, 1929. 7/6.)

two attitudes, and there is no reason to suppose that they may not co-exist in the same person at different times.'

Is religion, then, nothing but a mood, a temper? It cannot be said that our sceptical biologist reassures us on this point. 'It is obvious,' he says, 'that no final problem is solved by the subjectivation of science and religion, for their relative positions as interpreters of reality to us remain matters of discussion.'

It cannot be said that this position can be permanently satisfactory to those who attach supreme value to the religious outlook upon life. Men of science may bring themselves to endure the 'subjectivation' of science, but men of religion cannot follow their example. To them this will seem a stultification of everything they most value, and to be an opening of the door to profitless or pernicious emotionalism and superstition. If religion is only a 'mood,' induced, perhaps, by drugs or sexual indulgence, what is the use of it? Its preservation will not warrant the expenditure of ink and energy involved in the composition of an apologetic treatise.

In point of fact, the parallel between science and religion is not exact. Science in an intellectual formulation, or *scheme,* of sense experience; and it is *theology*, not religion, which is the corresponding intellectual formulation of mystical, or religious, experience. That is to say, science is not the experience itself, whereas religion *is*, definitely, a form of experience.

Mr. Needham's contention is therefore correct so far as science is concerned; but *not* so far as religion is concerned. And the corollary to his judgment about the subjectivity of science should be the subjectivity, not of religion, but of *theology*. Religious experience stands, like sense experience, as a means (imperfect, no doubt) of apprehending reality.

That theology must necessarily be tentative and subjective (in the sense of being formulated in the thought-forms of its period) is just what Modernists have always contended. But on the subjectivity of religious experience, Modernists can make no concessions—any more than Traditionalists.

One essay in this volume was the subject of a notice in these pages recently on its publication as a pamphlet in Dr. Dearmer's *Affirmations* series. At the time we quoted what we considered to be a remarkable passage:

> 'There is progress, an unfolding, an enrichment in religion just as there is in science, and to maintain that it is now over and that it ends with us is an absurd mixture of pride and pessimism.'

Does this mean that there can still be progress in theology, or actually in *religion*? Are there still discoveries to be made here? No one *a priori* has any right to answer this question in the negative.

This most readable book, characteristic as it is of the hospitable attitude towards religion which now characterizes our men of science, deserves to be widely and carefully studied. J.C.H.

A GREAT TEACHER OF THE ANCIENT CHURCH.*

The two greatest Biblical scholars of the ancient Church were Origen and Jerome, and it is one of the ironies of Church History that Jerome should have been cononised, but not Origen. Origen was in character and conduct one of the most saintly of men. He lived only to advance the Kingdom of God. He died a martyr under torture. He stands out as the Christian hero of Eusebius' *Church History.*

* *Selections from the Commentaries and Homilies of Origen.* By R. B. Tollinton, D.D. (Published by S.P.C.K., 1929. Price 10/-.)

Perhaps he had not the wonderful charm of Clement, his predecessor in the headship of the Catechetical School of Alexandria, nor had he his poetic power; but in Christian courage, in zeal, in single-mindedness, he was excelled by none. As a teacher he seems to have been superior to Clement possibly in erudition, but certainly in the extraordinary impression which he was able to leave especially on the minds of his abler pupils. A number of eminent servants of the Church of the latter half of the third century owed their inspiration to Origen. Origen had, however, besides erudition a very original speculative mind, and this rendered some of his teaching open to the charge of heresy. This Jerome had not, and so Jerome was canonised, and Origen was not. Christian Theology owes to Origen the doctrine of the Eternal Generation of the Word—the most profound of all post-New Testament contributions to Christian Theology.

Canon Tollinton has done a good service to the clergy and more cultured laity by his book of *Selections from the Commentaries and Homilies of Origen.* Origen wrote so much—some two thousand books—during his busiest period that he seems to have kept some seven secretaries employed—that few can read all he wrote. Consequently, of a good selection of his writings, it may be truly said 'the half is greater than the whole.' Many will get more from Canon Tollinton's volume than by attempting to read the works of Origen for themselves as translated in the Ante-Nicene Fathers. Canon Tollinton has prefixed to the selections a valuable essay on 'Origen as exegete.' It is interesting to compare it with Archbishop Trench's essay on 'Augustine as an interpreter of Scripture.' Origen is, of course, a great exponent of the allegorical method of interpretation: moreover he insisted on the unity of Scripture, and the impossibility that one passage could contradict another. In this perhaps he did the Church's teaching a serious injury. It is to Alexandria's great rival, the school of Antioch, that we owe the historical method of Scriptural interpretation—a method which is so fully presented for modern Churchmen in Benjamin Jowett's notable 'Essay on the Interpretation of Scripture.' When we read that essay we see how far the Church has advanced in exegesis since Origen's day, and advanced in the right direction. However, when we read Origen's commentaries, we feel that we are reading the expositions of an ancient saint with a most interesting mind, and it is always worthwhile to spend a little time in the company of a saint, whether he be ancient or modern. Canon Tollinton has supplied a number of useful references and notes to his carefully-made selections.

H.D.A.M.

MISCELLANEOUS BUT NOT UNIMPORTANT.*

We should like to call attention to the excellent quality of the articles in *The Bible* and *Modern Religious Thought Magazine.* The article by Professor Woolf on the Messianic Consciousness of Jesus is a careful, convincing statement. 'The Atonement,' by Mr. Elders, and 'The Reformation and the Book,' by Canon J. B. Harford, although short, are very clear and helpful. The magazine is published by G. Neal, 12 Patten Road, London, S.W.18, price 1/1 post free.

Many parents can get the help they need from *The Child's Approach to Religion,* by the Rev. H. W. Fox, D.S.O., M.A., (pub. Williams and Norgate, price 3/6, 1929). It possesses an Introduction by Bishop David, who says of it:

'I know of no book which sets forth so clearly and attractively a course of Christian teaching, definite yet sympathetic. I know of many

parents, including myself, who need and want exactly what it offers. And I think I can promise that it will help them to teach not only their children, but themselves.'

As the subject is very much in the forefront, *Church Union in South India,* by the Bishop of Madras (pub. by S.P.C.K., 2/-, 1929), will form a most useful supplement to the speeches and letters of Bishop Palmer. This is a very impressive, simple, matter-of-fact account of the negotiations which at last were crowned by success. Much prayer, patience and wisdom were needed. The chief feature of the method would appeal to that great statesman, Edmund Burke: the negotiators resolved to deal only with facts, and to leave theories out of account. That the Lambeth Conference will support their good work by an overwhelming majority we have no doubt. The volume contains a good map.

The Very Reverend Principal Perry has written an interesting volume on the value and history of *The Scottish Prayer Book* (pub. Cambridge University Press, 4/6, 1929). The new Scottish Prayer Book, it is affirmed, is marked by (1) *Our enlarged freedom, i.e.*, liberation from the Athanasian Creed on great Festivals and the 'imprecatory' Psalms on Sundays. To this is added the freedom of many alternative forms. (2) *Our wider Catholicity;* (3) *Concern for the needs of the laity;* (4) *New Knowledge.*

The Scottish Book of Common Prayer, published on 22nd November, 1929, by the Cambridge University Press, at prices ranging from 1/- to 30/- a copy, is well worthy of examination. It contains 'A Form of Benediction of Married Persons' which is greatly needed in England. As a whole the book, as might be expected, is distinctly Anglo-Catholic in many matters which are largely indifferent, *e.g.*, Wafers at the Communion. In other matters this is more serious, *e.g.* Reservation of the Elements is permitted apparently without restriction. We fear the new Scottish Prayer Book will not assist re-union with the Kirk of Scotland.

An exceedingly useful volume containing *The Collects, Epistles and Gospels of the Lesser Feasts and Fasts,* from the Deposited Book of 1928, has just been published in beautifully clear type by the Oxford University Press (price 2/6).

The selection of Epistles and Gospels is admirable. The new Collects are poor, both in thought and diction: their doctrine is often mediaeval. We cite as an example the Collect for All Souls' Day:

O Lord, the maker and redeemer of all believers: Grant to the faithful departed all the unsearchable benefits of thy Son's passion; that in the day of his appearing they may be manifested as thy true children; through the same thy Son Jesus Christ our Lord.'

This is amazingly poor in comparison with the Collects composed by our Tudor Reformers.

Mr. Dennis Jones, Precentor of Trinity College, Cambridge, has many pertinent things to say in *The Conduct of Public Worship* (pub. by Heffers, 2/6.). Ordinands will find it particularly useful. He cites a statement that 'Most of the aristocracy to-day seem to have but one ambition, to talk like costermongers.' The same article also enquires: 'What is one to do with the parson who whines through the liturgy of the Church of England like a sick hyena?' Obviously the right thing to do is to induce him to read Mr. Denis Jones' treatise and try to put it into practice.

We have received *The Book of Common Prayer* with the additions and deviations proposed in 1928. It is large octavo, beautifully printed, bound in buckram, price 12/6. H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

CHRIST AND PRE-HISTORY.

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

Having read with interest and close attention the article on ' Christ and Pre-History ' in the August issue of the *Modern Churchman*, I venture to make a few comments.

The first sentence of the last paragraph of this article expresses my own profound conviction—the outcome of my life's experience and study. On the foundation of belief in God the Infinite Creative Mind, possessing (as Mind must) Purpose in the Evolution of the World, we may confidently build a ' superstructure of loyalty to Christ Jesus as the greatest revealer of God and His Purpose which the world has yet seen ' : that is my creed. But I find certain passages in the earlier part of this article inconsistent with this paragraph. I will quote them : ' The individual is of no more moment where the purpose is concerned than a mighty civilisation in the past . . . There is no sacredness in human life . . . There may be no such thing as eternal life, what does it matter? '

If we accept Jesus as the revelation of God's Will and Purpose, are we not compelled to reject these statements? Allegiance to that Will was the supreme motive of His life, but careful attention to His acts and words shows that He was intensely individual; He combines individualism with universality. He declared that it was His meat to do His Father's Will just at the time when He had been devoting attention to an unimportant Samaritan woman. When He desired to teach the immanence of God in humanity He did so by clasping in His arms a little child, saying that whoever received such a child received Him and received God.

The bearing of this individualism on the statement ' There may be no such thing as eternal life, what does it matter? ' is obvious. That to continue a physical existence is not of great account seems to be a logical conclusion from the observation of history past and present, and this Christ confirmed by act and word. On the other hand, He taught, with an effectiveness which has been unique, that the individual soul has tremendous value and that eternal life is a possession in comparison with which physical existence is as dust in the balance.

H. A. DALLAS.

AN APPEAL FROM PEKING.

SIR,

Miss A. G. Bowden-Smith writes from the P'ei Hua School, Peking, to ask whether any lady reader of *The Modern Churchman* would be willing to go and work in that school among Chinese girls, who are not necessarily Christians. The work is done in English, and there is a fine opportunity for anyone ready to do missionary work on modern lines, capable of appealing to the intelligence as well as the hearts of intellectual and cultivated Chinese. The pay offered is the ordinary Mission Staff salary of £120 a year. Board costs about £3 10s. to £4 per month.

Further particulars can be obtained from Miss W. M. Bowden-Smith, 20 Addison Gardens, W.14, or Mrs. Roland Allen, Amenbury, Beaconsfield.

T. J. WOOD,

Secretary of the M.C.U.

CORRECTION.

It is incorrectly stated in the review of *Pioneer Prophets* in our August Number that the book is written by Mrs. Wells, whereas it ought to have been Miss Ursula Wells, a member of the M.C.U. We regret the error. —ED., M.C.